February 9, 191 1] 



NATURE 



477 



stood, amongst even the intelligent public, that the 

 scientific study of disease can be eftectively accom- 

 plished only at the outlay of much time and money. 

 It is gratifying, therefore, to find that in the ably 

 written article on the outbreak of rat plague in Suffolk, 

 which appeared in The Times of December 22, 1910, 

 the writer emphasises this point with refreshing 

 candour. He insists that in a crisis of this kind, the 

 effort to cope with the situation must be a national 

 one, and that the Government must authorise the 

 expenditure of ample funds to provide for the estab- 

 lishment of a staff of experienced investigators and 

 administrators to deal with the problem. The history 

 of the organisation of plague measures gives ample 

 proof of the futility of adopting plans, however vigor- 

 ous, that are not based on clear conceptions of the 

 disease gained by scientific research. 



iVHAT SCIENCE HAS DOSE FOR THE WEST 

 INDIES. 



A LITTLE more than a year ago I told in these 

 pages, with a very sore heart, the story of what 

 the late Sir Alfred Jones had accomplished for the 

 West Indies by enlightened commercial methods. That 

 chapter is unhappily closed, for no one has succeeded 

 him. It is a more hopeful task which is now imposed 

 upon me — to give some account of what science has 

 done, and will continue to do. It is worth the telling, 

 and it is more than a mere record of success, but car- 

 ries a moral of far-reaching extent. 



This journal, from its first number, has never ceased 

 to preach the necessity of applying knowledge to the 

 right conduct of human affairs. It continues to 

 preach, and in face of the stolid conservatism of 

 our methods, one might in a despondent mood think 

 with little effect. But if one looks back over long 

 periods it is not so, and the change in public opinion 

 as represented by governmental action is little short of 

 astonishing. 



When I first became engaged in colonial work some 

 forty years ago, the doctrine of laissez faire was in 

 full swing. It was held that self-interest would deter- 

 mine whether an industry- would succeed or fail ; if it 

 failed it deserved to do so, and another would take 

 Its place. In either case it was best to leave it 

 severely alone. This is not the place lu discuss how 

 far such a doctrine is sound. But practically it is con- 

 tinually being abandoned. No industry is now free 

 from governmental interference, and such interfer- 

 ence is only tolerable if directed bv adequate technical 

 knowledge. Interference must always be of the 

 nature of restraint, and at any rate theoretically one 

 mav ask whether some compensation is not justified. 

 It can hardly be doubted that the community will 

 have more and more to provide knowledge for in- 

 dustry of the kind that self-interest is powerless to 

 provide for itself. 



Mill, however, and other economists clearly saw 

 that academic economic principles were not univers- 

 ally applicable to agriculture. The reason is obvious : 

 the soil is not removable, but has to be utilised as 

 test it can, and where it is. If it went generally out 

 of cultivation food would fail. It was still, however, 

 left to laissez faire, except in some measure in India, 

 where the Government undertook the pioneering work 

 in regard to tea, cinchona, rubber, and some* other 

 staples, and then left their commercial development 

 to private individuals. In any other country but our 

 own the work of Rothamsted would have been pro- 

 moted by the State. There are undoubtedly advan- 

 tages in scientific research being left unfettered to 

 individual effort, but it is only the richest landowners, 

 such as Coke of Holkham, and the Dukes of Bedford, 



NO. 2154, VOL. 85] 



who can afford to add to agricultural knowledge by 

 experiment. The average cultivator is powerless to 

 follow other than traditional methods. Vet it is in 

 the interest of the community that he should do 

 better in order that the maximum return may be 

 obtained from the land. 



When this country began to acquire tropical posses- 

 sions, it was seen, however, that something more 

 than laissez faire was required for their economic 

 development. It was the Royal Society, at the hands 

 of its president, Sir Joseph Banks, who first took the 

 work in hand. Having the ear of the King, he was 

 able to use Kew, which was then the private property 

 of the Royal Family, for the purpose. The mutiny 

 of the Bounty was an incident in an attempt to add 

 to the cultural resources of the West Indies. An in- 

 direct result was the foundation of the great Dutch 

 colonial botanical establishment at Buitenzorg. When 

 it was decided that Kew should be maintained as a 

 national establishment, its colonial utility was appar- 

 ently one of the main reasons for the decision. In a 

 scheme which received the sanction of Parliament the 

 interests of "commerce" and "agriculture" were 

 recognised, as well as the supply '"of authentic and 

 official information on points connected with the 

 foundation of new colonies." Its functions in this 

 respect were steadily fostered by the Hookers, father 

 and son. The history of Kew thus affords one of the 

 earliest instances in this country of the recognition 

 of the duty of the State to promote scientific know- 

 ledge in the public interest. And the historic mean- 

 ing of the controversies which have occasionally 

 brought Kew prominently into public notice is simply 

 the attempt of a policy of laissez faire to arrest its 

 work. 



But anything which is rooted in sound principles 

 cannot be checked, because their necessity insists on 

 asserting itself; and the West Indies again supply the 

 illustration. Obviously their chief asset is solar 

 energy. Our channel islands supply us with early 

 vegetables. In a rule-of-three sum the West Indies 

 stand for the channel islands of the North Atlantic 

 shores. Alfred Jones saw this, and started a line of 

 steamers to flood us with West Indian fruit. But 

 this is anticipating. In the 'nineties their condition 

 was the reverse of prosperous. And, if it is a paradox 

 that science was indirectly the cause of the mischief, 

 it happily was able to supply the remedy. 



The Napoleonic empire left behind it two permanent 

 legacies — the French code and beetroot sugar. When 

 Napoleon's continental system closed the ports of 

 Europe to British colonial produce, the import of 

 tropical sugar was cut off. As sugar is a necessitv' of 

 modern food there was the strongest impulse to find 

 a new supply. I need not repeat a well-worn story. 

 The chemist and the cultivator lavished all their re- 

 sources on the unpromising beet, and ultimatelv de- 

 throned the sugar-cane. Then came the bounties 

 which flooded this country with sugar at scarcely 

 more than cost price, and drove cane-sugar out of 

 consumption. 



There is a fundamental principle in agriculture : 

 never to trust to a single crop. Ireland trusted to the 

 potato and Ceylon to coffee, and both failed them ; 

 this was from disease. The West Indies trusted to 

 sugar, and in their case the ruin was economic. The 

 balance of solar energy being in its favour, on equal 

 terms the cane should at least hold its own with the 

 beet. But now comes the mistake and its moral. The 

 sugar content of the cane was held to be incapable of 

 increase; the methods of manufacture were often 

 archaic and wasteful. Beetroot-sugar was the product 

 of the most refined scientific skill in both directions. 

 It was the fable of the hare and the tortoise. 



