Ma7'ch 20, 1879] 



NATURE 



455 



and yet no sensation follow. When a person is -n-riting, 

 the clock may strike in the room, the impressions on 

 ear, nerve, and brain being complete, and yet the next 

 moment he may have not the slightest memory of the 

 sound; certainly, at least, not the consciousness or 

 memory which in ordinary circumstances he would have 

 had. These organic impressions have thus to meet as it 

 were with something other than themselves — something we 

 call consciousness or mind — ere even sensation becomes 

 actual, or a mental fact. This truly reduces them to 

 the place of a simple concause, and shows that there is 

 another factor which they do not necessarily command, 

 and which must concur in the realisation of the very 

 lowest form of mental life. Then these physical ante- 

 cedents relate to but the lower phenomena of mind. 

 Even if it can be shown that imagination and intellect use 

 portions of the brain, it must at least be admitted that 

 they are there to use them. Can it be said that the 

 apprehension of relations, or the act of generalisation, or 

 volition, is properly spoken of as a conscious impression ? 

 Does Prof. Huxley imagine for a moment that any careful 

 psychological analyst would place such operations on a 

 level with the consequent of a series of organic move- 

 ments 



Again, what is the real meaning of the phrase that 

 " the operations of the mind are functions of the brain, and 

 the materials of consciousness are products of cerebral 

 activity?" (p. 80). Prof. Huxley quite sees and admits 

 that this is what is called "materialism," and indeed it is 

 nothing else. One ought to thank him for his candour. But 

 I should like very much to know the precise meaning of 

 the statement so characterised. WTien analysed, it means 

 this : that the nervous current generated by the brain out 

 of food and blood is transmuted into mind ; that as a 

 certain molecular motion is transmuted into heat, so a 

 certain nervous motion is transmuted into consciousness 

 or mind. Now it seems to me, on the other hand, that not 

 even sensation, to say nothing of intellect or the appre- 

 hension of relations of succession, coexistence, similarity, 

 has been shown to be the transmutation of nervous 

 force. We observe that physical forces are transmuted 

 into each other ; we can even quantitatively deter- 

 mine equivalents in this case. But the method fails us 

 the moment we seek to show that or how a state of 

 consciousness is a transmutation of the unconscious. 

 For now we are no longer dealing with forces of the 

 same kind — forces equally objects of consciousness itself — 

 and known to be, to a certain extent, numerically deter- 

 minable ; we are dealing with the unconscious and the 

 conscious ; we are trying to bridge a gulf, on the further 

 side of which we have no basis. We have no measure or 

 rule for showing how the unconscious and the conscious 

 are convertible, or that they have any conceivable relation 

 whatever. Besides, even if we get sensation out of 

 nervous force, what of the relations of difference, resem- 

 blance, succession, and coexistence among those sensa- 

 tions ? Mr. Huxley calls these impressions of impres- 

 sions. This is a very inaccurate expression. An impres- 

 sion of an impression must at least be picturable in the 

 imagination. It is not so here. These relations are dis- 

 cerned by the intelligence ; they suppose impressions ; 

 their material or nerve-antecedent is not observable, and 

 they can in no way conceiva,bly be referred to physical 



movements. Further, a physical or brain-force, though 

 it give one definite sensation, or even a series, cannot 

 provide for the pervading unity of self-consciousness. 

 Physical forces, which are perpetually changing, succes- 

 sive and different, cannot be made convertible with the 

 sense of unity which pervades all our consciousness. And 

 further, the consciousness of a series of impressions, 

 even of two impressions, the recognition of this fact or 

 relation, its being in our consciousness at all, implies a 

 standing unity of consciousness, a self or being, one 

 and identical, which may be awakened into conscious 

 life in or through those impressions, but which is in no way 

 made by them — rather, is necessary to their being made 

 or known. 



But is Prof. Huxley's conclusion at all consistent with 

 the law of physical energy? According to the law of 

 the transformation of energy, the energy represented by 

 motion or molecular change in matter passes into a con- 

 sequent, which is also a movement or molecular change. 

 The antecedent and the consequent states are still only 

 forms of molecular change ; and the amount or quantity 

 of the antecedent is represented by the amount or quantity 

 of the consequent. There is transformation of energy ; 

 but there is no change in the kind of the consequent. 

 Now according to Prof. Huxley, a state of consciousness 

 called sensation, or emotion, or idea, is as much the 

 result of "the molecular changes which take place in that 

 nervous matter which is the organ of consciousness, as the 

 nerve-vibrations are the result of the impact of the light- 

 waves on the retina." At the same time Prof. Huxley 

 holds that the state of consciousness is distinct in kind or 

 quality from the physical movement. It is psychical, or 

 a form of psychosis as opposed to neurosis. And indeed 

 he must admit a distinction in quality in the two cases.- 

 For the physical movement is possible — nay, is actually 

 carried on apart from consciousness ; whereas the sensa- 

 tion, the very lowest form of consciousness, is possible, 

 is actual only in consciousness itself. There is all the 

 difference between the fact which depends on observation 

 by eye- sight and the feeling which is self -guaranteeing 

 while it lasts, between the unconscious observed and the 

 conscious felt. But be this as it may, he admits the 

 distinction, as in fact impassable in thought. How is 

 it then consistent to say that the state of conscious- 

 ness is the effect of the physical movement? Either 

 the law of physical energy is observed, and then we 

 have only a physical movement as the determined result ; 

 or it is not, and then we have a state of consciousness, 

 something distinct in quality from a physical movement ; 

 that is, we have as the result of the given physical force 

 that which was not contained in the force as a simple- 

 quantum of physical energy. 



But Mr. Huxley, following, as he thinks, Hume, tells 

 us somewhat singularly that this materialistic doctrine of 

 the origin of mind "contains nothing inconsistent with 

 the purest idealism" (p. 80). In other words, what we 

 call matter turns out in the end to be a purely hypo- 

 thetical entity, assumed as a cause of certain states of 

 consciousness. The very conception of such an entity 

 is inconsistent with the basis here given ; for if our 

 sense-knowledge, indeed all our knowledge, be restricted 

 to states of consciousness called feelings, we are pre- 

 cluded from forming an idea even of matter as an 



