2^14 



NATURE 



[October 13, 192 1 



Dependence and Correlation. 



On these terms what is minded is no less mental 

 than the process of minding. But I suggest that 

 the word "consciousness" should be reserved for 

 that which Berkeley spoke of as "in mind by way 

 of attribute," or, in Prof. Alexander's way of put- 

 ting it, as " a quality " ot that organism which is 

 conscious in minding. Anyhow, consciousness is 

 here in the world. Creative evolution says : Yes, 

 here in the world, but not of the world. It acts 

 (as elan vital) into or through the organism re- 

 garded as a physical system ; but its source is ;, 

 disparate order of being to which, in and foi 

 itself, and an sich, it properly belongs. It depends 

 on the physical organism in act but not in being. 

 Now this, I urge, is a metempirical explanation 

 of given facts, but not an empirical interpretation 

 of them as (in my view) science tries to interpret. 

 And its cause should be tried before a different 

 court -of appeal from that of science. Hence 

 under emergent evolution one uses the word " de- 

 pendence " in another sense, and urges that the 

 very being of consciousness, as a quality of the 

 organism, depends upon (or implies the presence 

 of) the quality of life as prior in the natural order 

 of emergence. If we enumerate successive stages, 

 then consciousness is a quality (4) of certain 

 things (very complex and highly organised things) 

 in this world. In these same things there is also 

 present the quality of life (3), and a specially 

 differentiated chemical constitution (2). Empiric- 

 ally we never find (4) without (3), nor (3) without 

 (2) ; and we express this by saying that conscious- 

 ness depends on (or implies the presence of) life ; 

 and that life depends on a specialised kind of 

 chemical constitution. It is an irreversible order 

 of dependence. But there are things, such as 

 plants, in which we find (as is commonly held) 

 life without consciousness ; and other things, such 

 as minerals, in which there is chemical constitu- 

 tion (not, of course, "the same" chemical con- 

 stitution) without life. Furthermore, there seems 

 to have been a time when consciousness had not 

 yet been evolved ; and an earlier time .at which 

 life had no existence. But this or that chemical 

 constitution is itself an emergent quality (2) of 

 certain things ; and there was probably a yet 

 earlier stage of evolution at w^hich even this 

 quality had not yet emerged — a purely physical 

 stage (i) at which (let us say) electrons afforded 

 the ultimate terms in relation within physical 

 events, continuously changing under electro- 

 magnetic (and, of course, also under spatio-tem- 

 poral) relations. 



There is clearly nothing in the foregoing thesis 

 which necessarily precludes the further considera- 

 tion of the same events from the point of view of 

 creative evolution. The questions : What makes 

 emergents emerge? What directs the whole 

 course of emergent evolution? — these questions 

 and their like are there quite in place. Further- 

 more, as between emergent thesis and creative 

 antithesis, Kant's "Solution of the Third Anti- 

 nomy " may afford a guiding clue. 

 NO. 271 1, VOL. loS] 



The Quality of Consciousness. 



Before proceeding further certain preliminary 

 questions must be briefly considered. First, is 

 there progressively emergent evolution in con- 

 sciousness? It is a question of cardinal import-- 

 ance. My contention is that such evolution obtains 

 in both aspects, inner and outer, the one in correla- 

 tion with the other. This means that interpreta- 

 tion under emergent evolution is applicable to 

 mental no less than to non-mental events. In 

 other words, there is just as much progressive 

 emergence in the inner or psychical aspect of 

 organic nature as there is in the outer or physio- 

 logical aspect. This is the keynote of mental 

 evolution throughout its whole range. 



I regret here to depart from the conclusion to 

 which Prof. Alexander has been led. Take such 

 episodes in our mental life as seeing a rainbow, 

 hearing a musical chord, partaking of woodcock, 

 dipping one's hands into cool water. In Prof. 

 Alexander's interpretation (as I understand it) 

 percipient consciousness, in each case, differs only 

 in what he speaks of as "direction." That alone 

 is enjoyed. All further difference in one's cogni- 

 tive experience on these several occasions is due 

 to the difference in that non-mental set of events 

 with which one is then and there compresent. 

 Even feeling, as affective, is not itself enjoyed. 

 Feelings are objective experiences of the order of 

 organic "sensa." They are not in mind by way 

 of attribute. We are conscious of pleasure and 

 pain but are not differentially conscious in receiv- 

 ing them. Consciousness is here just compresent 

 with certain phases of life-process. Thus, for Prof. 

 Alexander, consciousness, alike in sensory 

 acquaintance, in perceptive cognition, and even in 

 feeling pleasure or the reverse, is itself undiffer- 

 entiated (save in " direction ") ; all the differentia- 

 tion is in the non-mental world (beyond us or 

 within our bodies) which is experienced and which 

 transmits its characters to a recipient in w^hich the 

 rather featureless quality of consciousness has 

 emerged. 



Consciousness and Enjoyme^it. 



Thus far the word "conscious" is used in the 

 broad and comprehensive sense that was almost 

 universally accepted a generation ago. But in 

 accordance with current usage we must now dis- 

 tinguish consciousness from the unconscious. I 

 happen to regard the word "unconscious" as 

 peculiarly unfortunate — chosen as it is on the 

 lucus a non lucendo principle. But let that pass. 

 There it is and we must make the best of it- 

 seeking to penetrate its dark wood. Under the 

 older and more comprehensive use, consciousness 

 may be indefinable. As in the case of spatial or 

 of temporal relatedness we have got down to 

 something that we find, rather than to something 

 that can be strictly defined. Hence one has tO' 

 proceed by indicating instances that fall within 

 the inclusive class which we so name. The posi- 

 tion is that, in the comprehensive class which we 

 used to comprise under the heading of conscious- 



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