October 13, 1921] 



NATURE 



215 



ness, it is now thought desirable to make two 

 sub-classes — (a) the unconscious and (b) the con- 

 scious. There is call, therefore, for the indication 

 of some criteria which shall serve to distinguish 

 the one from the other. Here definition is re- 

 quired. And since the unconscious is "served 

 with the negative prefix," it is clear that the 

 criteria we seek must distinguish by their presence 

 the conscious from the unconscious in which these 

 criteria are absent. Under what heading, then, 

 are we now to place the comprehensive class in- 

 cluding both (a) and (b)? I suppose we may call 

 it the class of psychical events — as distinguished 

 from physical and physiological events. But we 

 still want some convenient noun which we may 

 qualify by the adjectives "conscious" and "un- 

 conscious." I borrow from Prof. Alexander, and 

 adapt for my present purpose, the name " enjoy- 

 ment. " Perhaps the chief objection to the choice 

 of this word is that it must be understood as 

 including what is unpleasant no less than that 

 which is pleasurable. But as I cannot find a 

 better, and am loth to coin a worse, I ask leave 

 to use this word "enjoyment" to include all that 

 has the psychical character or aspect. I regard 

 the emphasis on affective tone which it suggests 

 as a pomt in its favour. 



On these terms there fall within the compre- 

 hensive class of enjoyment two sub-classes : 

 [a) unconscious enjoyment and (b) conscious 

 enjoyment — the latter marked by certain differ- 

 entiating criteria. The question now arises : Is 

 the distmction between the conscious and the un- 

 conscious just the same as that which is often 

 drawn between " above the threshold " and 

 "below the threshold" (supraliminal and sub- 

 liminal)? Or, if they are not just the same, is 

 there such close and intimate alliance that we may 

 still say that all that is supraliminal is conscious 

 and all that is subliminal is unconscious? 

 What I wish to suggest is that the line between 

 supraliminal and subliminal need not be coincident 

 with that between conscious and unconscious. 

 There are, I believe, modes of enjoyment both 

 conscious and unconscious in the supraliminal 

 field. But this reopens the main question : What 

 are the differentiating criteria of the conscious? 



Criteria of Consciousness. 



Ask the plain man what he means when he 

 sp>eaks of acting consciously and he will probably 

 reply : " I mean doing this or that with some 

 measure of intention and with some measure of 

 attention to what is done or to its outcome. The 

 emphasis may vary ; but one, or other, or both, of 

 these characterise action that I call conscious. If 

 I offend a man unconsciously there is no intention 

 to give offence. When a cyclist guides his 

 machine unconsciously he no longer pays atten- 

 tion to the business of steering, avoiding stones 

 in the road, and so forth." Now if this correctly 

 represents the plain man's view, it is clear that 

 a full consideration of his attitude would involve 

 careful discussion of intention and of attention. 



NO. 271 I, VOL. 108] 



This is beyond my present scope. I want to dig 

 farther down so as to get at what, as I think, 

 underlies his meaning, and thus to put what l 

 have to submit in a much more general form. 



I want, if possible, to get down to what there 

 is in the most primitive instances of consciousness. 

 — i.e. right down to that which characterises them 

 as such, I believe that there is always in addition 

 to that which is immediately given (say under 

 direct stimulation in sense-awareness) some 

 measure of revival with expectancy, begotten of 

 previous behaviour in a substantially similar situa- 

 tion. Consciousness is always a matter of the 

 subsequent occasion, and always presupposes a 

 precedent occasion. In other words it is the out- 

 come of repetition ; and yet, paradoxically, when 

 it comes it is something genumely new. But this 

 is the very hall-mark of emergence. That is why 

 Prof. Alexander and I speak of consciousness as 

 an emergent quality. 



Let us analyse some simple first occasion— that 

 on which a chick behaves to a ladybird will serve. 

 The eye is stimulated from a distance with accom- 

 panying enjoyment (a). The chick responds by 

 approaching and pecking with enjoyment in be- 

 having (b). There follows contact stimulation 

 with its enjoyment (c) ; and, thereon, behaviour 

 of rejection with its enjoyment (d). We 

 have thus, as I interpret, a biologically 

 determined but orderly sequence affording 

 successive modes of enjoyment a, h, c, d. 

 So far the precedent occasion. On a subse- 

 quent occasion there is (a) as before in pre- 

 sentative form ; this is immediately given in sen- 

 sory acquaintance. But {b, c, d) are also " in 

 mind " — mediately or in re-presentative guise, 

 under revival, as what Prof. Stout calls "mean- 

 ing." We have therefore (under an analogy) on 

 the precedent occasion the notes a, h, c, d, struck 

 in sequence. We have on the subsequent occa- 

 sion (h, c, d) rung up by (a) through a 

 " mechanism " provided psychically and neurally 

 in the instrument. And when the notes (a, h, c, 

 d) thus vibrate together they have the emergent 

 quality of what one may speak of as the chord of 

 consciousness. 



What is there, however, about this emergent 

 chord which differentiates it from the precedent 

 sequence of notes a, h, c, d? It must be some- 

 thing psychical in its nature. I suggest that the 

 revival carries with it a specific mode of new 

 enjoyment which may be called " againrfess " ; that 

 which affords the basis of felt recognition. There 

 is also something equally new in expectancy. 

 That this is (so far as our own experience testi- 

 fies) a factor in the chord of consciousness is, I 

 should suppose, scarcely open to question. 



Now whereas on the precedent occasion it is 

 behaviour unconsciously directed towards that 

 from which stimulation arrives that determines 

 the order h, c, d as sequent on a, on the subse- 

 quent occasion it is the " meaning " (b, c, d) which 

 then consciously determines the direction of be- 

 haviour. This centering of " meaning " on that 



