21-6 



NATURE 



[October 13, 1921 



to which behaviour was on the precedent occasion 



Unconsciously directed is the ' b&sis of conscious 

 reference to an object. 



The characteristics, then, of a chord of con- 

 sciousness are revival with expectancy and with 

 conscious reference which anticipates, and, 

 through anticipation (thus forestalling- the event), 

 may endorse or inhibit, the further course of 

 behaviour. And its emergent character, as chord, 

 makes consciousness, not merely an additive blena 

 of constituent tones of enjoyment, but (in Brown- 

 ing's forcible emphasis on a wholly new quality) 

 "a star." (Cf. Aht Vogler.) 



I have thus far dealt with the criteria of con- 

 sciousness on the lines of what I conceive to be 

 its evolutionary genesis. I must now ask whether 

 these criteria- — revival with expectancy and refer- 

 ence — do not characterise what we commonly 

 regard as conscious enjoyment in our own adult 

 life. My own experience is consonant with the 

 outcome of genetic treatment. And I would ask 

 others if there is not in our current consciousness 

 always some measure of felt " againness " carried 

 over from the past in revival, and always some 

 measure of "comingness" in expectancy. I 

 would ask whether there is not, as essential to 

 consciousness, some leaning back on previous ex- 

 perience, some leaning forward to that which the 

 future has in store. Is not this what M. Bergson 

 means (I do not say all that he means) when he 

 speaks of consciousness as "a hyphen" linking 

 past and future? 



Levels of Psychical Integration. 

 In our normal life much integration proceeds 

 on the reflective level — -that of rational thought 

 and volitional conduct. The older philosophers, 

 with some variation of terminology, urged that 

 the dift'erence between this reflective level and the 

 perceptive level below it (e.g. in Descartes's 

 animal automatism) is one not only of degree but 

 of kind. The difference, they said in effect, is 

 radical and absolute, demanding metempirical ex- 

 planation. Thus the word " kind " carried a 

 definitely metaphysical implication the influence of 

 which is still with us to-day. But apart from this, 

 as a matter of frankly empirical description of 

 what is found, it was their way of expressing 

 what I seek to express by saying that reflective 

 consciousness has a new emergent quality — that 

 which characterises reason as distinguished from 

 perceptual intelligence. We have, however, the 

 one word "consciousness" for both these levels. 

 But within the more comprehensive sub-class, 

 comprising all instances of consciousness, we may 

 distinguish two sub-classes subordinate therein, 

 (i) that of instances of reflective consciousness, 

 and (ii) that of instances of non-reflective con- 

 sciousness. Both sets of instances have the 

 criteria of consciousness. But in (i) there is a 

 further differentia in that "value" (in the tech- 

 nical sense) is referred to the object of such re- 

 flective thought. There is then, on this view, 

 reflective integration, and there Is also non- 

 NO. 271 1, VOL. 108] 



refl^ective or perceptive integration, each . oi)., its 

 appropriate level, and each in its distinctive way, 

 conscious. 



In dealing with the supraliminal field it seems, 

 to me imperative to distinguish according to the. 

 mode of origin of the integration that obtains 

 therein. We must ask : How far is the 

 "form" which it assumes (iii) the outcome of 

 reflective integration ; (ii) the outcome of unre-. 

 flective or perceptive integration ; and (i) the out- 

 come of the integration in the subliminal uncon- 

 scious to which as living beings we are heirs? If 

 I am right in regarding (ii) and (iii) as succes- 

 sively emergent qualities of consciousness there is 

 somewhat of a leap (though no breach of con- 

 tinuity) from (i) to (ii), and from (ii) to (iii). There 

 is always something more (involving new terms 

 in new relations) in the higher-level conclusion than 

 is contained in the lower-level premises. This 

 is the cardinal principle of all emergent evolution. 

 Without this there would be nothing really new — 

 merely a reshuffling of the old. 



Are there Unconscious Images and Ideas? 

 In the interpretation to which I have been led 

 unconscious enjoyment (not necessarily involving 

 unconscious images and ideas) is no lesS inte- 

 grated than is the system of physiological events 

 which gives to life its emergent quality. If the 

 analogy be permitted, just as in the physiological 

 symphony of life there are chords and phrases 

 and motifs, each with an emergent character of 

 its own {e.g. the part played by the instruments 

 of the reproductive sub-system), so too, in the 

 psychical symphony of unconscious enjoyment 

 there are correlated chords, phrases, and motifs. 

 And all goes well so long as due balance and 

 harmony are maintained in the orchestral perform- 

 ance, no matter what instruments play a dominant 

 part at the time being. But unconscious enjoy- 

 ment is primarily inherited psychical music cor- 

 related with the outcome of life-inheritance. I 

 entertain little doubt that the life of animals, 

 could we only feel its inner aspect as they them- 

 selves do, is brim-full of a rich music of uncon- 

 scious enjoyment. As I write the swifts are 

 wheeling and shrilling in the summer air. Am I 

 wholly wrong in imputing to them an integrated 

 form of enjoyment which is theirs on a basis of 

 inheritance? Perhaps even sympathetic natural- 

 ists fail adequately to realise to what extent in 

 animals the business of life as such, with further 

 life as its wage, has also its psychical reward in 

 enjoying so fully the performance of life's job. 

 And this reward in the enjoyment of doing is in- 

 herited with the ability to do. A behaviourist 

 interpretation of how it all comes about is, I 

 believe, perfectly sound in its way. Not in what 

 it emphasises, but in what (among extremists) it 

 ignores — a psychical factor — does it seem to me 

 to be deficient. In us at any rate the presence of 

 enjoyment is undeniable. And though it is so 

 readily caught up into consciousness it still carries, 

 I think, the marks of its unconscious origin. 



