332 



NAT [/RE 



[November io, 192 i 



carried out on chlorine or chlorine compounds. ' 

 ' There were seven or eight men working in the 

 Institute on these problems, but we heard nothing 

 more until Haber went to the Battle of Ypres.'" 



Ludendorff, in his "War Memories," refers to 

 the valuable services of Geheimrat Haber in 

 connection with the use of gas. 



That what has come to be known as "chemical 

 warfare " was intended by the Germans to be the 

 novel and distinguishing feature of the war they 

 had so sedulously planned was abundantly proved 

 by its subsequent course. The liaison between 

 the German G.H.Q. and the Interessen Gemein- 

 schaft, the organisation which controlled the 

 great chemical manufacturing establishments of 

 Germany, was complete. It was mainly through 

 the agency of the I.G. that in the first place 

 Geheimrat Haber and his colleagues were fur- 

 nished with the poisonous products they needed 

 for their trials, and it was the I.G. that directed 

 the Badische Anilin- und Sodafabrik at Ludwigs- 

 hafen, the chemical factory at Berlin, of which 

 the late Dr. Martins was the head, Hochst, Lever- 

 kusen, and the rest of the great Rhine dyestuff- 

 producing works, all working in concert, to supply 

 the various lethal substances, eighteen at least, 

 which it was eventually decided to employ. 

 The I.G. organisation was comparatively simple. 

 It lay ready to hand, and could be promptly set in 

 motion with no bureaucratic friction and no 

 official delays. Much of the plant needed to pro- 

 duce synthetic dyes could equally well produce syn- 

 thetic poisons, and the apparatus was of a type 

 that could be rapidly augmented if necessary. 



It was these conditions which, no doubt, in the 

 first instance, led the Germans to plan their new 

 war method. The unique position of their great 

 manufacturing establishments, with their special 

 machinery and experience, their perfect organisa- 

 tion and scientific direction, their intimate co- 

 operation, their hundreds of trained chemists, and 

 their thousands of skilled workmen, gave them an 

 overwhelming advantage over their enemies. The 

 marvel is that they should have ultimately failed. 

 They had the initial advantage of surprise, and 

 at one period it is certain that the way to the 

 coast, which it was their objective to reach, was 

 open to them; but by the mercy of Providence 

 they were made blind to their opportunity, and we 

 all know the sequel. It was that the Allies eventu- 

 ally beat the Germans at their own game. 



What we are now concerned to know is whether 

 the game is to continue. Has chemical warfare 

 come to stay? Military experts apparently halt 

 between two opinions. The issue would seem to 

 rest with Germany. This issue will give her pause 

 NO. 2715, VOL. 108] 



to think. Those who seek to guide her policy 

 must take stock of her position as the war has left 

 it. Is she in the same strong position now in 

 regard to her organic chemical industry that she 

 occupied prior to 1914? If, with the condition of 

 that industry as it was in all the Allied countries at 

 that period, she yet failed, what chance would 

 she have now? The development of applied 

 organic chemistry in this country, in France, or in 

 America, is not at present all that we might wish 

 jto see it, or as assuredly it will be in the not 

 remote future, but it is still very considerable. 

 Each country is immeasurably better able to with- 

 stand the German menace of poison gas, and, if 

 necessary, to retaliate with it, than it was half a 

 dozen years ago. 



We have learned by experience. The initial 

 advantage of organisation and surprise in the pro- 

 duction and military use of poison gas no longer 

 rests with Germany — at least, to nothing like their 

 former extent. She has already paid dearly, both 

 morally and materially, for her breach of the 

 Hague Convention to which she had subscribed, 

 and it is not difficult to suggest means whereby 

 she can be still further penalised should she fail 

 to give adequate assurance, when required, that 

 she means to abandon the new war method she 

 has initiated. Should she be required to abandon 

 it? This is a matter which surely falls within the 

 purview of the Washington Conference on dis- 

 armament. The Covenant of the League of 

 Nations has already incidentally dealt with it. 

 Article 8, however, requires to be more explicitly 

 directed to it. Moreover, the power of the League 

 needs to be strengthened to enable it to deal more 

 effectively with breaches of its regulations. 



If the German menace were removed there 

 w ould probably be little difficulty in securing inter- 

 national agreement among members of the League 

 to ratify once more the article of the Hague Con- 

 vention to "abstain from the use of projectiles the 

 object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating 

 or deleterious gases." Germany cannot continue 

 to remain outside the League. Sooner or later 

 she will put herself in order and apply to come 

 in. Her national position and her future as a 

 world-Power will require it. Once a member she 

 must subscribe to, and must obey, its conditions. 

 It must rest with the League to enforce, if neces- 

 sary, Germany's obligations. The loss of the 

 markets of the world for the products the Inter- 

 essen Gemeinschaft controls might be the least of 

 the penalties she might be made to incur for a 

 breach of them. 



The whole story of the inception and develop- 

 ment of gas warfare by Germany has still to be 



