1 66 



NATURE 



fApRiL 7, 192 1 



any discoverable consciousness or not. Experi- 

 ence may thus include behaviour and conscious- 

 ness, but need not include the latter. Behaviour, 

 or the action of the organism on its environment, 

 is typically mental (as defined). Consciousness is 

 the subjective accompaniment, or so-called inner 

 aspect, of some, but not of all, modes of be- 

 haviour. In the more complex cases of adjust- 

 ment we know far more about the conscious than 

 the physiological aspect, though we have reason 

 to believe that such an aspect is always present. 



The thesis is worked out with commendable 

 consistency ; and what G. H. Lewes would have 

 called the metempirical factor is rigorously ex- 

 cluded. One cannot here enter into details or 

 follow up the definitions which the method of 

 treatment carries with it. Since, however, cona- 

 tion bulks so large in much current English dis- 

 cussion, attention may be directed to the attenu- 

 ated form it here assumes. "We may define 

 conation as the mental state which accompanies 

 any involuntary or automatic movement or any 

 bodily position of which we are aware." It is 

 simply the conscious correlate of behaviour itself. 

 The place, if any, of consciousness in the causal 

 nexus is not discussed. 



Dr. Culpin's " Spiritualism and the New Psy- 

 chology " (4) purports to give an explanation of 

 spiritualist phenomena and beliefs in terms of 

 modern knowledge. By modern knowledge is 

 meant that version of Freudian hypothesis (as 

 presented by Dr. Bernard Hart in his "Psychology 

 of Insanity ") which is recapitulated in the first 

 four chapters. The book is brightly written, is 

 flavoured with the spice of satire, and contains 

 much criticism that is not only clever, but also per- 

 tinent and acute. It will do much to strengthen 

 the conviction of those who are already convinced. 

 Whether it will alter by a hairbreadth the 

 belief of sundry others is open to question. Still, 

 the missionary effort is warmly commended by 

 Prof. Leonard Hill in an able introduction. 



A touch of piquancy marks the position which 

 Dr. Culpin seeks to defend. On one hand, there 

 are certain phenomena which look as if disem- 

 bodied spirits were concerned in their manifesta- 

 tion. On the other, there are certain phenomena 

 which look as if memories were stored in "the 

 unconscious." The author argues that wholly 

 erroneous beliefs are founded on the former "as 

 if," and that in the light of "modern knowledge" 

 a valid explanation of them may be given in terms 

 of the latter "as if," supplemented by one or two 

 more of like nature. Whether " memories " in 

 the unconscious are embodied or disembodied, and 

 in what manner they are "stored," are problems 

 NO. 2684, VOL. 107] 



on which no light is thrown. Now a crucial ques- 

 tion for scientific thought is this : What is the 

 justification in any given case for passing from 

 "as if" to "is"? No doubt we all jump with 

 fatal facility from one to the other, and fail to 

 realise that "of course it obviously stands to 

 reason that it must be so " falls very far short of 

 "it is so." Dr. Culpin thinks that there is no 

 justification for the saltum mortale of the spirit- 

 ualist. Does he adequately justify his saltatory 

 acceptance of memories, ideas, wishes, thoughts, 

 and the rest, in the unconscious? He must, too, 

 be well aware that there is another "as if" which 

 puts in a claim to be an "is." Thus Prof. 

 Warren (3) says : — 



"The popular notion of memory is based upon 

 too close an analogy with perception. Objects in 

 the environment continue to exist even when we 

 do not perceive them. Popular psychology as- 

 sumes that ' memory objects ' (memory images) 

 persist in much the same way. It is true that 

 something remains in the brain after the sensation 

 ceases, which furnishes the basis for future 

 memory images. But what remains is not a ' pic- 

 ture ' of the object or event, but merely a record ; 

 it is a trace or set or retention effect of some 

 sort in the structure of the neurones or synapses." 



There are thus at least three " as ifs " which put 

 in a claim for acceptance — that of Sir Oliver 

 Lodge, that of Dr. Culpin, and that of Prof. 

 Warren. The author's attitude towards Sir 

 Oliver Lodge and his school is clear enough. One 

 would like to know with greater definiteness his 

 attitude towards Prof. Warren and his school. 

 But perhaps their tenets do not fall within 

 "modern knowledge." C. Ll. M. 



Physiology for Students. 



Essentials of Physiology. By Prof. F. A. Bain- 

 bridge and Prof. J. Acworth Menzies. Fourth 

 edition. Pp. viii + 497. (London : Longmans, 

 Green, and Co., 1920.) 145. net. 



THE fourth edition of Profs. Bainbridge 

 and Menzies 's work differs but little 

 from the previous one; only a few of the 

 sections have been rewritten. As the authors 

 state in the original preface, their object is 

 "to bring together in a concise form the 

 fundamental facts^ and principles of physio- 

 logy." They certainly have succeeded, for 

 they do not waste a word, if we omit the 

 tables inserted in the section on the distribu- 

 tion of the cutaneous sensory nerve-endings. We 

 cannot see that the knowledge of the actual 

 minimal pressure stimuli in various parts of the 

 body is of great importance, and these tables, in 



