Relation of the Federal Government to Research 



35 



the mechanical parallelism in effect for administrative 

 purposes. Bureaus are made up of numerous divi- 

 sions and subdivisions, with a single head for each 

 unit or section. The section leader has a higher classi- 

 fication and receives a higher salary than others in the 

 same unit, and his duties are largely administrative. 

 Thus a showing of administrative responsibility has 

 come to be required for promotion to the higher grades, 

 and ''there is a great temptation to leave research for 

 the more remunerative executive positions." 



The problem can be solved only by classifying posi- 

 tions in accordance with the importance of the work 

 done and the standard of performance in the doing, 

 rather tlian in terms of the number of subordinates 

 over whom authority is exercised. Such a solution 

 would often mean that a research specialist might hold 

 a higher position and receive a higher salary than his 

 immediate administrative superior ; but this should not 

 be a serious objection. The system must also provide 

 foi- promotion in grade and salary whenever these are 

 clearly deserved, without long enforced delays until 

 a "vacancy" occurs. 



The inadequacy of the classification system now in 

 force is evidenced by the turnover of scientific men 

 in the more advanced positions. Again this is pri- 

 marily true in fields in which industry competes, but 

 that includes many Government agencies, such as the 

 Army and Navy, the Bureau of Standards, the Bureau 

 of Chemistry and Soils, and the Reclamation Service. 

 The latter Bureau states the case conservatively : 



Opportunities for advancement in the Bureau's research divi- 

 sions are relatively infrequent. Consequently the younger 

 engineers often resign to accept employment with nongovern- 

 mental agencies who are able to pay higher salaries. 



It is not meant to imply that all Government salaries 

 are too low. Only those for professional and scientific 

 work are being considered here, and adequacy can be 

 judged in any event only in comparative terms. Gen- 

 erally speaking, the entrance salaries and top salaries 

 in Government are higher than those paid by universi- 

 ties for comparable positions with the intermediate 

 salary range less satisfactory. Industrial salaries, on 

 the other hand, are considerably higher than those of 

 Government except in the lowest professional grades, 

 and this disparity tends to make certain Federal bu- 

 reaus, through no will of their own, into training 

 schools for industry. Interchange of personnel be- 

 tween Government and industrial or academic estab- 

 lishments may be mutually advantageous, but only if 

 it works both ways, and if it does not take place on 

 such a scale as to disrupt the scientific program of 

 either agency. 



Opportunities for promotion, and even salary scales 

 for comparable work, vary between agencies, which 



adds another factor to the personnel problem. Thus 

 the Bureau of Fisheries — 



not only competes with and loses valuable employees to the 

 industry, but it must meet the competition of other Govern- 

 ment agen(;ios. Th(!re are several recent examples where 

 highly trained personnel of this Bureau have transferred to 

 other Government agencies at two professional grades higher 

 in salary than their positions in this Bureau. In some cases 

 this transfer did not involve more responsible duties or require 

 more ability. 



It is hardly surprising to find that loss of personnel to 

 other agencies, public and private, is "entirely too 

 rapid for the best interests of the Bureau's work." 



Permanence of Tenure 



The same permanence of tenure which undoubtedly 

 attracts to the Government service a certain mjmber of 

 high-caliber scientific men also attracts, and for the 

 same reason, a type whose ability is below the average. 

 Through failure to keep the registers active, a certain 

 number of these are appointed, and many of them man- 

 age to survive the probationary period. They are then 

 virtually irremovable in practice. Though the civil 

 service rules permit discharge for cause, little use is 

 made of the privilege, partly because of inertia and 

 partly because the appeal in such cases is too often 

 through the familiar channel of the spoils system. A 

 private establisliment would be free to weed out the 

 mediocre, but under the civil service such a course is 

 slow and difficult. 



The security offered to the civil service employee is 

 undoubtedly one of the most important and most de- 

 sirable features of the Federal service, but it must be 

 carefully safeguarded or it will become, as to some 

 extent it has already become, a means of perpetuating 

 incompetence instead of attracting ability. Both more 

 careful selection of candidates for appointment and a 

 longer and more closely supervised probationary period 

 are indicated. 



The Public Health Service now uses a commissioned 

 personnel as well as employees from civil service lists, 

 and has maintained high standards among the former 

 by requiring examinations for promotions, with the 

 alternative in the lower grades of separation from the 

 service. The mixture of commissioned and civil sei^v- 

 ice employees in the same agency, however, does not 

 always work out satisfactorily. The Bureau of Con- 

 struction and Repair of the Navy, for example, relies 

 on commissioned officers to direct its laboratories, but 

 the number of officer specialists is limited and rotation 

 of duties makes them often unavailable because of pres- 

 sure of other work. ''Thus the effects of this shortage 

 of specialized officer personnel for research work are 

 most keenly felt when shipbuilding work is most active, 

 i. e., when the answers to research problems are most 



