Relation of the Federal Government to Rei^earch 



149 



authorized, and the funds for their support were voted 

 by the legislature, provision was, in most cases, made 

 that their personnel should be selected by tlie chief 

 executi\e and that they should work under the gen- 

 eral direction of that officer. This was also the char- 

 acter of the President's Commission on Economy and 

 Efficiency that functioned during the years 1911-13. 

 Though this type of inquiry is the one that generally 

 has commended itself to our legislative Ijodies, exami- 

 nation, both of the principles involved and of the 

 results achieved, would indicate that the alternative 

 type, that of an inquiry by the legislature itself, is the 

 preferable one. In practice, this means the entrusting 

 of the investigation to a special or joint committee 

 rather tlian to a commission. 



As has been pointed out, the legislature, under our 

 form of government, is the source of all administrative 

 authority and is thus the organ in which is vested, in 

 the final instance, the function of direction, supervision, 

 and control in the administrative field. Logically, 

 therefore, it is the legislature which, as principal, 

 should from time to time institute such investigations 

 as are necessary in order to assure itself that its 

 agents — the administrative services — are performing 

 their duties in an efficient and economical manner. 

 Furthermore, as the source of all administrative 

 authority, upon it falls the duty of determining all 

 large matters of organization and procedure. 



To these theoretical considerations should be added 

 the important practical one that, when an inquiry is 

 prosecuted under legislative auspices, its chances of 

 having the reforms recommended put into effect are 

 much enhanced. The unfortunate jealousy, friction, 

 and strained relations often existing between the legis- 

 lature and the executive makes it difficult for the execu- 

 tive to secure the adoption of proposals em.anating 

 from him. It has been disheartening to those inter- 

 ested in improving public administration that the re- 

 ports of the State economy and efficiency commissions, 

 most of which have been excellent documents, prepared 

 vvith great care with the aid of a carefully selected 

 corps of competent experts, have so often been pro- 

 ductive of such relatively slight results. Indeed, in 

 not a few cases, the recommendations made have failed 

 of even serious consideration. One explanation of this 

 is, without question, the source from which the recom- 

 mendations have emanated. Had these reports been 

 prepared under the direction of a special or joint com- 

 mittee it is practically certain that they would have 

 received other treatment. This would have been due, 

 not merely to the fact that the recommendations con- 

 tained in the reports were recommendations of their 

 own representatives, but to the further fact that, in 

 these representatives, the legislature would have had 



persons who were not only interested in the changes 

 suggested but, through their membership in the legis- 

 lature, were in a position to take direct action through 

 the framing and introduction of bills, and of explain- 

 ing, defending, and urging the adoption of these meas- 

 ures upon the floor of the two chambers. Much tlie 

 most important recommendation of the President's 

 Commission on Economy and Efficiency was the adop- 

 tion by the Government of a proper budget system. 

 This recommendation received almost no consideration 

 at the hands of Congress. A few years later, however, 

 a similar proposal emanating from a House Select 

 Committee was speedily adopted almost without 

 change. It is true that changed conditions made such 

 a reform more urgent and that a process of education 

 had in the meantime been at work, but the fact that 

 the proposal had the endorsement of its own select 

 committee and that, in the chairman of that com- 

 mittee, the House had someone to pilot the measure 

 through the chamber, were undoubtedly the determin- 

 ing factors in securing action. 



It need hardly be said that if this type of inquiry 

 is used it is essential that authority be conferred upon 

 the committee to employ a competent director of re- 

 search and staff of experts in the several matters to be 

 inquired into, the committee itself sitting as a board to 

 give direction to the inquiry and to pass upon the 

 data and recommendations submitted to it by such 

 director and staff. 



Investigating Powers of Congress 



Though Congress has from the beginning prosecuted 

 investigations into matters in which it was interested, 

 the scope of its powers to make inquiries of this char- 

 acter has constantly been called in question in the courts 

 as lacking a constitutional basis or as doing violence 

 to certain of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing 

 private rights. Though the issues thus raised are gen- 

 erally described as ones concerning the investigatory 

 powers of Congress, they in fact have to do primarily, 

 if not exclusively, with the methods open to Congress 

 in making such inquiries, rather than with the right 

 of Congress to make the inquiry, and especially the 

 power of Congress or its agencies, committees, and 

 commissions to compel the attendance of witnesses, the 

 giving of testimony, and the production of books and 

 papers by them, and the punishment for contempt of 

 recalcitrant witnesses. 



This is not the place to attempt any detailed con- 

 sideration of the legal questions involved in this mat- 

 ter. It is pertinent, however, to reproduce here an 

 extract from one of the most important decisions of 

 the Supreme Court of the United States in which the 

 power of Congress to make inquiries, and, in so doing, 



