222 



NATURE 



\yan. 5, I 



Then it is remarked, " To be conceived at all, a thing 

 must be conceived as having attributes" (p. 47) ; and yet the 

 author -admits that it is impossible to assign any attribute to 

 space (p. 48). So that it would appear from the last impossibility 

 that space is not a thing (or entity). 



It is added, "All entities, which we actually know as such, 

 are limited " (p. 48). But, on the other hand, it is allowed 

 that, "Of space and time we cannot assert either limitation 

 or the absence of limitation " (p. 48). 



It is observed also as follows: — "Nor are space and time 

 unthinkable as entities, only from the absence of attributes " 

 (p. 48). This would involve the conclusion apparently that 

 that is considered to be an entity which is absolutely " unthink- 

 able " a> such. 



Must there not be some flaw here, and some solution 

 possible? 



I have to propose — and this may appear very bold at first 

 sight — that space is a non-entity. I must explain my meaning 

 more fully. The first question or difficulty will be. How can 

 we conceive of space (a void) or even talk of it, if it be a 

 non-entity or nothing? In fact, on p. 177 is the remark, 

 " Nothing cannot become an object of consciousness." 



In reply to this, I would venture to suggest that under certain 

 conditions, nothing can become an object of consciousness, viz. 

 hv contrast with something. We can be conscious of an absence. 

 Darkness can become an object of consciousness by contrast with 

 light. So space in itself — which I contend is nothing — is an 

 object of consciousness -^ by contrast with matter. 



We consider space to be an entity, I fancy, because of our 

 experience with palpable air, &c. , which (for convenience, but 

 inaccurately) is called space. Space per se, an absolute void, we 

 have no experience of. We measure all so-called spaces with 

 matter — standards made of matter. We estimate how much 

 solid matter is absent in a room (for instance), which we call its 

 " volume." Mathematical lines are unconsciously figured as 

 material no doubt from our habit of drawing them ; and the 

 spaces of triangles, &c., are usually filled out with solid 

 matter. 



It would be ridiculous (as it seems) to ask what would happen 

 if a void disappeared. It cannot disappear because it is already 

 nothing. 



In regard to matter, we can conceive a certain volume of it, 

 a certain volume added to that, &c. ; and no doubt we cannot 

 easily limit the conceivability thus extending to a larger volume. 

 But we are not forced (by necessity as it were) to conceive an 

 infinite volume of any entity or actually existing thing; and it 

 appears that a void is excluded from the category of the un- 

 knowable, as we cannot expect to know anything about 

 nothing. 



Why do we hear of the creation of matter speculated about 

 (as an inadequate attempt at explanation), but the creation of 

 space regarded as absurd ? '-^ Because the first is an entity and the 

 second is not. A non-entity cannot be supposed to be created, 

 or it is absurd to ask the question. 



One may encounter difficulties of explanation by assuming too 

 much to exist — too much to explain, it appears. So I account for 

 some of the startling contradictions supposed to exist at the basis 

 of knowledge. What is nothing, if a void be not nothing ? In 

 order to be face to face with nothing and contrast it with 

 something, we should not liave to abolish a void, I venture to 

 think. 



Another matter seems important. On p. 34 ("First Prin- 

 ciples") is the following, viz.: — "Did there exist nothing but 

 an immeasurable void, explanation would be needed as much as 

 now. There would still arise the question. How came it so ? 

 If the theory of creation by external agency be an adequate one, 

 it would supply an answer ; and its answer would be — Space 

 was made in the same way that matter was made. But the im- 

 possibility of conceiving this is so manifest, that no one dares 

 to assert it. For if space was created it must have been pre- 

 viously non-existent. The non-existence of space cannot, how- 

 ever, by any mental effort be imagined. . . . We are unable to 

 conceive its absence either in the past or in the future." 



' It appears that in order to assert an exii ence there must be a conception 

 of non-existence as a contrast ; otherwise the word ' ' existence " would seem 

 t ) have no distinct meaning. If matter be an existence, its absence (or a void) 

 must be a non-existence. In other words, an absolute void (vacuity) is con- 

 templated as the absence of existence. 



^ The author remarks of space, on p. 48, as follows : — " The only attribute 

 which it is possible f jr a moment to think of as belonging to it, is that of 

 extension ; and to credit it with this implies a confusion of thought. For 

 extension and space are convertible terms." 



In regard to the commencing passage, viz, "Did there exist 

 nothing but an immeasurable void, explanation would be needed 

 as much as now," it might be asked. When would you be satis- 

 fied with an explanation ? Explanations must finish somewhere ; 

 they finish at existences, I should fancy, and cannot extend to 

 their absence. It is this demanding explanation perpetually, 

 without conceived limit, that leads to the c3ntradictions and 

 attempts at defining nothings — as seems manifest. Extraordinary 

 as this view taken by the author appears, it is consistent with 

 his assumption that an absolute void is an existence or thing, 

 whereby it is put o 1 the same footing as matter. But observe to 

 what this further leads. 



First, the inconceivable existence of an infinite thing without 

 attributes is assumed. Second, its non-existence cannot "by any 

 mental effort be imagined." This means, in my view, that all 

 attempts to imagine it more nothing than it is, are fulile. What 

 better definition of nothing could we have than that we cannot 

 assert it to have "either limitation or the absence of limita- 

 tion," or it is "unthinkable " as an entity " from the absence of 

 attributes "? 



Well, in this way, actual existence of something which is put 

 on the same footing as matter seems to be made a necessity for 

 an infinite past time ; as (unlike matter in this respect) we can- 

 not even imagine change here— in fact, the original creation of 

 this thing (a void) no one dares to assert." In the same way, 

 no one would venture to assert the creation of a mathematical 

 line, or a mathematical plane, i.e. the creation of extension ^ of 

 one, two, or three dimensions. 



From the author's conclusion that space is an entity, it may be 

 reasoned, then, that, since we must apparently have one existence 

 for an infinite past time, we may as well have two, or include 

 matter. Hence, with all the deference which the views as a 

 whole in the " First Principles" demand, I would point out that 

 in this way support is given to the idea of existence for an in- 

 finite past time (impossible to grasp fairly, as the author con- 

 cedes) — which, as I contend, is not warranted by the facts. 



S. ToLVER Preston. 



30 Rue de la Clef, Paris, December 1887. 



Christmas Island. 



Having read with much interest the description of Christmas 

 Island by Captain Aldrich and Mr. Lister, I have endeavoured 

 to interpret some of the facts there given in the light of my own 

 examination of similar islands in the Western Pacific. As 

 pointed out by Captain Wharton, the complete casing of an 

 island, 1200 feet in height, with coral rock is somewhat unusual. 

 This may find its explanation in in the absence of stream-courses 

 and ravines, a circumstance from which I infer that the island 

 has not been exposed sufficiently long, since its upheaval, to the 

 denuding agencies. When its surface has been extensively 

 carved out by the action of running water, the old volcanic 

 peak, which these upraised reefs envelop, will in all probability 

 be exposed. Christmas Island, therefore, has still the early part 

 of its story to unfold. 



The three tiers of cliffs evidently mark pauses in the elevation. 

 As they appear to decrease in height with the ascent, it would 

 seem tliat older lines of cliffs on tlie upper slopes of the island 

 have been removed to a great extent by denudation. The prin- 

 cipal features of the movement of upheaval appear to resemble 

 those of which similar upraised coral islands give evidence in the 

 West Indies, Western Pacific, and other regions of elevated 

 coral reefs. Protracted elevatory movements of from loo to 

 300 feet are separated by long pauses, during which cliffs are 

 worn back by the waves, and the reefs grow seaward : hence 

 the terraced profiles of these islands. I have pointed out that 

 in the Solomon Group these protracted movements consist of a 

 succession of small upheavals of usually 5 or 6 feet at a time. 



17 Woodlane, Falmouth. H. B. Guppy. 



A Mechanical Cause of the Lamination of Sandstone 

 not hitherto noticed. 



The lamination of sedimentary rocks is usually attributed to 

 the successive deposition of sediment of varying degrees of fine- 

 ness or coarseness. Currents of water have a selective action 



' The author remarks that "Extension and space are convertible 

 terms " (p. 48). I may express my agreement with the author as to the 

 inadequacy of the theory of the " creation " of matter, as an explanation. 



