ya7i. 26, 1888] 



NATURE 



291 



More than half of Prof. Schurman's essay (which alto- 

 gether extends to but abDut 250 small octavo pages) is occu- 

 pied with a preliminary discussion of Darwinian principles 

 /^^-r j't', or without special reference to ethic-;. Here his 

 object is to argue in favour of " teleological variation" 

 along "beneficial" or "predetermined" lines — support- 

 ing this argument in the usual way by denying that 

 natural selection is a cause of organic change. Natural 

 selection can only act on the materials supplied to it by 

 variation : it does not itself create these materials, and 

 therefore leaves where it was before, the question as to 

 the origin of the fittest. This argument always appears 

 to us transparently fallacious ; but, as our object at pre- 

 sent is to consider what Prof. Schurman has to say on 

 " the ethical import of Darwinism," we will not occupy 

 space by discussing the weaker half of his work. In 

 ethics, however, he is strong ; and, in our opinion, has 

 produced one of the best defences of the intuitional side 

 which has appeared since the publication of the " Descent 

 of Man." 



He begins by pointing out the distinction between the 

 utilitarianism of Bentham and of Darwin — viz. the dif- 

 ference between " pleasure-giving and power-giving," or 

 hedonism and life-serving. Next, he provisionally allows 

 that the Darwinian theory furnishes a proximate or 

 natural explanation of the " innateness, immutability, 

 and universality of moral conceptions." He also allows 

 that, at all events to a large extent, this theory is able to 

 explain the authoritativeness of conscience. But, having 

 thus frankly conceded all that the Darwinist has to 

 demand, he turns upon him as follows : — 



"Is it forgotten that, even if goodness be an end in 

 itself — the sole end worth living for^it still remains true 

 that honesty is the best policy, that honest acts are the 

 most advantageous acts, and that they will accordingly 

 be preserved through natural selection in the struggle for 

 existence? All that natural selection requires is that 

 something shall be useful ; what else it viay be, what 

 other predicates it may have, natural selection knows 

 not and seeks not. Be virtue a proximate or an ultimate 

 end, natural selection tells us it will be preserved and 

 perpetuated if it be useful ; and it tells us no more. It 

 is, accordingly, a gratuitous assumption which our ex- 

 ponents of evolutionary ethics make, when they decline 

 to allow more than a merely relative value to morality." 



The first thing to notice about this position is, that the 

 Darwinian, qud Darwinian, has nothing to do with it. 

 All that the Darwinian, as such, undertakes to show is, 

 that conscience and the moral sense, in all its protean 

 forms, admit of being explained as proximately due to 

 natural causes. Whether or not these natural causes 

 are themselves the results of a final cause, intelligent and 

 moral — this is a question which Darwinism leaves the 

 ethical philosophers to wrangle about. 



But now, suppose that a man is not only a Darwinian, 

 but also an ethical philosopher, what is he to make of 

 I Prof. Schurman's conclusion that "it is a gratuitous 

 assumption which our exponents of evolutionary ethics 

 m ike, when they decline to allow more than a merely 

 relative value to morality"? Surely such a man must 

 feel that the burden of proof here lies with the intuitionists. 

 It is they who affirm a supernatural quality of the moral 

 sense, over and above the natural origin of it which (as 

 agreed) the Darwinian has explained ; therefore it is for 



them to show that their " assumption " of the absolute 

 value of morality is other than "gratuitous." This burden 

 Prof. Schurman seeks to discharge as follows : — 



" In opposition to this mechanical theory of conscience, 

 we hold that it is an ultimate function of the mind, and 

 that in germ, as in full fruition, it must be regarded, not 

 as an action, but as an ideal of action. . . . This view of 

 the subject may be affiliated to Darwinism as readily as 

 the other. For an abiding ideal of action is, to say the 

 least, quite as beneficial as a chance action ; and wher- 

 ever there is an advantage, there natural selection may 

 operate." 



Now, without question, " an ideal of action is quite as 

 beneficial as a chance action " ; but is it not evident that 

 the Professor is here proving too much ? The more he 

 can show that "an ideal of action" admits of being 

 developed in the race by natural causes'on account of its 

 utility to the race, the more is he playing into the hands 

 of his opponents, so long as they do not agree to assume 

 with him that morality is of any absolute or ultra-human 

 signification. But it is precisely this assumption which 

 he is -required to justify; and the above attempt to 

 discharge his burden of proof, far from making " in 

 opposition to the mechanical theory of conscience," is 

 merely a re-statement of that theory, //«i' his original 

 assumption. 



Mr. Best is not nearly so matured a thinker upon 

 ethical problems, and yet upon this important matter he 

 displays a clearer vision than Prof. Schurman. He 

 shows that the intuitive (or instinctive) side of conscience 

 is everywhere an " ideal of action " ; but he also shows 

 that where it stands alone, or without reasoned percep- 

 tions of utility, it is everywhere an ideal impossible to 

 realize. With considerable originality and success, he 

 argues that the moral ideal, in all phases of its develop- 

 ment, is essentially irrational, inasmuch as it could only 

 realize itself completely in a population all the members 

 of which " are equal, asexual, and immortal." He then 

 goes on to ask : — 



" Suppose such an idea should become actually 

 operant, and endeavour to realize itself in thought, 

 or in action, in this world of inequality, sexuality, birth 

 and death, what kind of phenomenon might we expect to 

 arise from the conflict between idea and fact ? Might we 

 not expect to find in those in whom the moral intuitions 

 were best developed a constant protest against things as 

 they are? Might we not expect to find a hankering after 

 equality? Might we not expect to find some, in reaction 

 against that inequality which, in the form of wealth, 

 obtrudes itself before their eyes, take refuge in voluntary 

 poverty ; might we not expect others to endeavour by 

 force or contrivance to bring about the reign of equality ? 

 Might we not expect the dim picture of an asexual world 

 to make men revolt against sex and sexual relations, and 

 cry up celibacy as the holiest condition possible ?" &c. 



Thus, then, the moral ideal is more or less out of joint 

 with actual fact ; and although it is easy enough to 

 understand why such should be the case if it is but of 

 relative significance — or of no further meaning than that 

 which arises from its utility to the race — we cannot so 

 well understand why such should be the case if it be of 

 absolute significance. And, if we extend our view beyond 

 the human race, we are met by a similar difficulty. Not 

 only man, but the whole creation, groans in pain and 

 travail — that is to say, the unmoral as well as the moral ; 



