16^ 



NA TURE 



[Feb. 1 6, 1888 



and letters from him ; and, as he has acknowledged in his book, 

 I carefully studied these specimens and gave him all the advice 

 and assistance in my power in carrying on his geological in- 

 vestigations. Upon his return we had several conversations, 

 always of the most friendly character, concerning the best mode 

 of embodying his observations for cooomunication to different 

 Societies ; and until the present time I had not the smallest idea 

 that he was in any way dissatisfied with anything I had ever 

 said or done in connection with the subject. 



With respect to a particular conversation referred to by Dr. 

 Guppy as having occurred in the spring of 1885, I have no 

 recollection whatever ; but I unreservedly accept his statement 

 as to the facts of the case, and only demur to his interpreta- 

 tion of them. If Dr. Guppy or anyone else asked my opinion 

 as to the fitness for the Geological Society of " a paper in 

 which Mr. Darwin's theory of coral reefs would be brought 

 under con>ideration," I should undoubtedly point out to him 

 that the Geological Society had alv/ays been averse to publishing 

 papers dealing with such broadly theoretical questions as the 

 origin of coral reefs, and I should advise some other means of 

 publication as more appropriate. 



That the Geological Society is not partial in its reluctance to 

 publish papers of a theoretical character will be seen from the 

 fact that although Mr. Darwin in 1837 read a paper to the 

 Society, embodying the chief points of his theory of coral reefs, 

 yet the Society never published the paper in their Transactions. 

 At the time that this occurred Darwin was a member of the 

 Council, and a few months later he became Secretary of the 

 Society. 



It is surely unnecessary for me to remark that in any advice 

 which I gave to Dr. Guppy, I was acting simply on my own 

 judgment and individual responsibility. Dr. Guppy was a 

 Fellow of the Society at the time, and had precisely the same 

 right to present papers to it which I had myself. Dr. Guppy 

 chose to ask my advice ; I gave it to him as to a friend, and he 

 was perfectly free to act upon it or to reject it as he thought fit. 

 I may add that the Secretary of the Geological Society has 

 nothing to do with the acceptance or rejection of papers, except 

 as a member of the Council, and then only when the question 

 has been brought up by the President for the approval or 

 condemnation of his own action. 



How my imofficial act of friendly advice concerning the 

 destination of an unwritten paper came to be represented as the 

 refusal of a paper offered to the Society I am at a loss to con- 

 ceive ! Why the Duke of Argyll, having received the statement 

 which is now before us, should proceed to formulate the very- 

 grave accusation against Prof. Bonney personally, and the 

 authorities of the Geological Society, it is for his Grace to 

 explain. 



With respect to Dr. Guppy's complaint that his memoirs 

 have been " studiously ignored " during the recent controversy, I 

 cannot help thinking that he has been unduly sensitive. Writing 

 to Prof. Huxley in October last year, and pointing out that the 

 Duke of Argyll was mistaken in supposing there had been no 

 discussion on Mr. Murray's theory, I said "it would be an end- 

 less task to attempt to give references to the various scientific 

 journals which have discussed the subject," but in penning these 

 words I had not the smallest idea of speaking slightingly of 

 any of the memoirs which want of space prevented me from 

 citing, and least of all concerning those which contain the facts 

 and observations of Dr. Guppy, of the value and importance of 

 which I had such good opportunities of judging. 



John W, Judd. 



Reason end Language. 



Prof, Max Muller has been so kind as to favour the 

 readers of Nature with his views on language and reason, 

 concisely expressed in a letter to an American friend. As one 

 grateful reader, I much desire both to express my thanks, and also 

 to beg for yet a little further information with respect to matters 

 of suih extreme interest. 



The Professor says : " Becavse we reason — that is, because we 

 reckon, because we add and subtract — therefore we say that 

 we have reason." Now, in the first place, I shouM be glad to 

 be told why "reason " is to be regarded as identical with such 

 " recl'Oning " ? I have been taught to distinguish two forms of 

 intellectual activity : (i) acts of intuition, by which we directly 

 apprehend certain truths, such as eg. our own activity, or that A 

 is AS; and (2) Acts of inference, by which we indirectly ap- 



prehend others, with the aid of the idea " therefore " — evolving 

 into explicit recognition a truth previously implicit and latent in 

 premisses. The processes of addition and subtraction alone, 

 seem to me to constitute a very incomplete representation of our 

 mental processes. 



The Professor also identifies language and reason, denying to 

 either a separate existence. As to "reason" he says : "We 

 have only to look into the workshop of language in order to see 

 that there is nothing substantial corresponding to this substan- 

 tive, and that neither the heart nor the brain, neither the 

 breath nor the spirit, of man discloses its original whereabouts." 

 The expression " whereabouts " would seem to attribute to 

 those who assert the existence of "reason," the idea that it 

 possesses the attribute of extension ! In order to understand 

 clearly the passage quoted, we should learn what Prof. Max 

 Midler really means by the term " spirit," which here figures as 

 one species of a genus also comprising the breath, the brain, 

 and the heart. Reason, however, is not represented as being 

 simply language "as we now hear it and use it," but "as it 

 has been slowly elaborated by man through all the ages of his 

 existence upon earth." Ihus understood, the Professor 

 "cannot doubt" "the identity of reason and language." 

 Nevertheless, he immediately proceeds to point out a strik- 

 ing want of identity between them. He says, quite truly, 

 " We have two words, and therefore it requires with us a 

 strong effort to perceive that behind these two words there is 

 but one essence," — namely, that denoted by the Greek word 

 logos — " the undivided essence of language and thought." Now, 

 the intimate connection of language (whether of speech or 

 gesture) with thought is unquestionable ; but intimate connection 

 is not "identity." If thought and language are ^'■identical,'" 

 how came two words not to have two meanings, or two thoughts 

 to be expressed by one word ? The plain fact that we have 

 different words with one meaning, and different meanings with 

 one word, seems to demonstrate that thought and language 

 cannot be "identical." 



"No reason without language — no language without reason " 

 is a statement true in a certain sense, but a statement which 

 cannot be affirmed absolutely. Language (meaning by that 

 term only intellectual expression by voice or gesture) cannot 

 manifestly exist without reason ; but no person who thinks it 

 even possible that an intelligence may exist of which ours is but 

 a leeble copy, can venture dogmatically to affirm that there is 

 no reason without language, unless he means by reason, mere 

 "reasoning," which is evidently the makeshift of an inferior 

 order of intellect unable to attain certain truths save by the 

 roundabout process of inference. 



But I demur to the assertion that truly intellectual processes 

 cannot take place in us apart from language. In such matters our 

 ultimate appeal must be to our own reflective consciousness. 

 Mine plainly tells me that I have every now and then appre- 

 hensions which flash into my mind far too rapidly to clothe 

 themselves even in mental words, which latter require to be 

 sought in order to express such apprehensions. I also find myself 

 sometimes expressing a voluminous perception by a sudden 

 gesture far too rapid even for thought-words, and I believe that 

 other persons do the same. A slight movement of a finger, or 

 the incipient closure of an eyelid, may give expression to a 

 meaning which could only be thought in words by a much slower 

 process. 



It is the more remarkable that Prof. Max Miiller should deny 

 the existence of reason, ^ince he unequivocally affirms, in rather 

 lofty language, the existence of truth. Yet surely the existence of 

 truth, in and by itself, is inconceivable. What can truth be, save 

 a conformity of thoughts and things ? I affirm, indeed, the certain 

 existence of truth, but I also affirm that of reason, as existing 

 anteriorly to language — whether of voice or gesture. What is 

 the teaching of experience ? Do men invent new concepts to 

 suit previously coined words, or new words to give expression 

 to freshly thought-out concepts ? The often-referred-to jabber 

 of Hottentots is not in point. No sounds or gestures which do 

 not express concepts would be admitted by either Prof. Max 

 Miiller or myself to be "latiguage." 



The Professor speaks of the "alarmingly small" number of 

 primitive concepts ; but who is to be thereby alarmed ? Not 

 men who occupy a similar stand-point to mine. I fully agree 

 with Prof. Max Miiller in saying, " After the genesis of the first 

 concept, everything else becomes intelligible." 



We come now to the supreme question of the origin of languages. 

 As to this, the Professor observes : "No one who has not himself 

 grappled with that problem can appreciate the complete change 



