March 15, 1888] 



NATURE 



463 



nascent concepts in some forms of bodily expression by means 

 of which they would quickly understand one another. 



As to the expressions " rea-.on " and "reckoning," I would 

 observe that a study of an organism's embryonic develop- 

 ment is a most valuable clue to its nature, and no doubt a 

 similar utility attends historical investigations in Prof. Max 

 Midler's science. Nevertheless, we cannot understand the 

 nature of an animal or plant by a mere knowledge of an early 

 stage of its existence ; an acquaintance with the outcome of its 

 development is even more important. Similarly, I venture to 

 presume, the ultimate meaning of a word is at least as much 

 its true meaning as is some archaic signification which may 

 have grown obsolete. The word "spirit," if it once meant only 

 the breath, means more now — as we see from the Professor's first 

 letter. Similarly, if "reason," in its Latin form, once only meant 

 "reckoning," that is no "reason" why it shauld only mean reckon- 

 ing now. Here it would seem as if we had an instance of the z'^;7'«w 

 vientale having acted upon and modified the verbnm oris. I cannot 

 but regard the representation that affirmative and negative proposi- 

 tions are mere cases of addition and subtraction as an incorrect 

 and misleading representation, save when they refer to mathe- 

 matical conceptions. I am compelled also to object to another 

 of the Professor's assertions. He says : — "There is a wide 

 difference between our apprehending our own activity and 

 apprehending that A is A. Apprehending our own activity is 

 inevitable, apprehending that A is A is voluntary." It is true 

 there is a great difference between these apprehensions, though 

 they both agree in being instances of apprehensions which are 

 not inferences, and as such I adduced them (Nature, February 

 16, p. 364). Nevertheless in my judgment the difference 

 between them is not the difference which the Professor states. 

 Both are alike voluntary, regarded as deliberate reflex cognitions, 

 and both are alike inevitable, regarded as indeliberate, direct 

 perceptions. The labourer inevitably perceives that his spade is 

 what it is, though the nature of that perception remains un- 

 noticed, just as he inevitably perceives his own continuous being 

 when he in no way adverts to that fact. 



I must further protest against the assertion that the idea " there- 

 fore" is " present in the simplest acts of cognition" — that every 

 perception of an object is an inference. This I regard as one of the 

 fundamental errors which underlie all the madness of idealism. 

 Akin thereto is the notion that a philosopher who desires to speak 

 with the very strictest accuracy ought, instead of using " the big I," 

 tosay, "a succession of stales of consciousness." Tome it is 

 certain that even one state of consciousness (to say nothino' of 

 " a series ") is no more immediately intued by us than is the 

 substantial ego ; each being cognized only by a reflex act. What 

 I intue is my "self action," in which intuition both the "ego " 

 and the "states" are implicitly contained, and so can be ex- 

 plicitly recognized by reflection. I was myself long in bondage 

 to these two errors, from which it cost me severe mental labour 

 to escape by working my way through philosophicd subjectivism. 

 These questions I cannot here go any further into, and I only 

 mention them in consequence of Prof Max Miiller's remarks. I 

 will, however, in turn, refer him to my " Nature and Thought," 

 as well as to a larger work which I trust may before long be 

 published, and which, I venture to hope, he will do me the 

 honour to look at. 



My object in calling attention to the fact that one word may 

 have several meanings, and several words one meaning, was to 

 show that there could not be "identity" between thought and 

 language. This point the Professor seems practically to concede, 

 since he now only calls them "inseparable, and in one sense 

 identical." I do not understand degrees of identity. No mere 

 closeness of resemblance or connection can make two things 

 absolutely identical. I did not, however, content myself with 

 denying this "identity" on account of polyongeny and homo- 

 nymy ; I also referred to common experience (which shows us 

 that men do not invent concepts for preformed words, but the 

 reverse), and I appealed to certain facts of consciousness. To my 

 assertions about corisciousness the Professor replies: "The 

 object of all scientific inquiiy is the general and not the indi- 

 vidual." But this is a quite inadequate reply, since our know- 

 ledge of general laws is based on our knowledge of individual 

 facts, and if only one man could fly, that single fact would be 

 enough to refute the assertion that flight is impjssible to man. 



With respect to evolution, I never said that Prof. Max 

 Midler misunderstood "natural selection," but only that he 

 misrepresented it — of course unintentionally. It is of the essence 

 of natural selection not to affirm teleology as formerly understood, 

 although, of course, it can say nothing (for the whole of physical 



science can say nothing) about a primordial teleology at the 

 foundation of the entire cosmos, I, in coaimon with the Pro- 

 fessor, look forward to " the ultimate triumph of reason and 

 right," but my confidence is not due to any "faith" I have in 

 " Nature " or anything else. I profoundly distrust " faith" as 

 an ultimate basis for any judgment; I regard my conviction as 

 a dictum of pure reason — the certain and evident teaching of that 

 science which underlies and gives validity to every other. I 

 therefore agree with Prof. Max Midler in regarding it as a lesson 

 which "true philo.sophy teaches us." 



St. George Mivart. 



Oil on Troubled Waters. 



It may interest some of the readers of Captain Wharton's 

 paper on this subject to have their attention called to a curious 

 narrative in Bede, illustrative of the power of oil over troubled 

 waters. When a certain presbyter, Utta, was sent from the 

 North of England by Oswiu to fetch his bride from Kent, he 

 applied to Aidan, the greatest teacher of his day. for his blessing. 

 Aidan gave him not merely his blessing, but some consecrated 

 oil, and told him that on his way back from Kent by sea he would 

 encounter a storm, and thereupon he was to pour the oil on the 

 sea, which would immediately become calm. It happened as 

 St. Aidan had foretold. Utta and his fair charge were duly 

 overtaken by a fearful tempest ; the waves were breaking over 

 the ship, when Utta bethought himself of Aidan and his oil. 

 "Assumpta ampulla, misit de oleo in pontum, et statim, ut 

 praedictum erat, suo quievit a fervore " (" Historia Ecclesiastica," 

 lib. iii. cap 15). Aidan had been brought up at the monastery 

 of lona. Did the boatmen of the W^estern Islands in the seventh 

 century know of this use of oil? and did Aidan bring the 

 knowledge from thence that saved from shipwreck Utta and 

 the bride Eanfleda ? Edw. Fry. 



Were the Elephant and Mastodon contemporary 

 in Europe ? 



One of the most effective services which Nature does for 

 the cause of science is to enable students who live far apart to 

 exchange ideas in its correspondence columns. May I be 

 allowed to ask a question of some interest, perhaps, to others 

 besides myself? It is a singular fact that we probably know less 

 of the sub-aerial conditions prevailing in so-called Pliocene times 

 than we do of those of m )st geological horizons. The marine 

 Mollusca of this age have been preserved in large numbers and in 

 many places, but the remains of the land fauna are singularly 

 sporadic and broken. 



I know of no fragment of a land surface of this age which 

 exists in Britain. In the Crags we have a very puzzling medley 

 of mimmalian bones and marine shells mixed heterogeneously, 

 and pointing unmistakably to the beds having been rearranged, 

 and, as the P'rench say, rcinanie. 



Unfortunately the Pliocene period has been largely defined on 

 the evidence of these very unsatisfactory beds — uasatisfactory 

 not merely because it is certain that the remains of land and 

 marine animals are confusedly mixed up in them, but also- 

 because it is exceedingly probable that the debris of two geo- 

 logical stages have been mixed together also. 



It seems clear to me that, if the Pliocene age is to be clearly 

 defined, we must not rely upon the evidence of the English 

 Crags for defining it, but go elsewhere — namely, to France, Italy, 

 &c. 



It is very well known that nowhere in France has the 

 mastodon, which is generally accepted as a very typical Pliocene 

 mammal, been found in the same beds with the elephant. In 

 the English Crags, no doubt the older type of elephant (the 

 E. mcridionalis) and possibly also molars of the later forms 

 {E. antiqmis and E. primigenins) have occurred with mastodon 

 remains and the remains of other so-called Pliocene beasts ; but 

 the mixed character of these deposits puts them out of court, 

 and we are bound to follow the evidence of the French beds, 

 which occur in situ and unmixed, if we are to be assured of our 

 position. 



My purpo e in writing is to ask whether the Italian evidence 

 is the same as the French. Unfortunately the Italian beds do 

 not seem to me to have been studied with the minute care which 

 they deserve. No doubt enormous numbers of mastodon re- 

 mains and also of remains of E. ineridionalis occur close together 

 in Italian deposits, but so far as I know the question has not 

 been critically tested as to whether they occur in the same beds 



