58o 



NATURE 



{April 19, 1888 



are still performed. There is no paralysis. The early- 

 stage of drunkenness is a good example. There is the 

 uncontrolled action of the centres usually subordinate to 

 the highest controlling, but now non-functioning, centre. 

 There is in such an instance, "the withdrawal of the 

 stimulus of frequent positive impulses." In later stages 

 there is something more than temporary suspension or 

 inhibition ; there is destruction of the highest centres and 

 actual paralysis. Under " Conduct " Dr. Mercier con- 

 siders the human organism and the environment along 

 with the adjustment of the former to the latter. He care- 

 fully follows the lines of Spencer, and points out that the 

 study of mind belongs neither to the first nor to the 

 second, but only to their adjustment. 



Our space does not admit of our following the author in 

 his study of the "Constitution of Mind," in which he 

 endeavours, with, we think, imperfect success, to prove 

 that the feelings cannot be disordered without dis- 

 orderofthe intelligence. Were" this theoretically true, 

 so far from having a "practical bearing of great 

 moment," it would be an instance of an abstract theo- 

 retical proposition being, strictly speaking, true, while 

 for all practical purposes experienced alienists tell us they 

 find it necessary to admit a moral insanity with an 

 average amount of intelligence. Alienists will no doubt 

 discuss this and other conclusions stated in the third 

 part of this work, and we leave the task in their hands. 

 The most original portion of the work is that in which 

 Dr. Mercier classifies cognitions and feelings, dissenting 

 as he does from the classification of Spencer in several 

 important particulars, upon which we cannot enter. 



There will, of course, be the same criticism on the 

 position taken by the author as is frequently offered to 

 that of his master. True, there is no denial of mind ; on 

 the contrary, emphasis is laid upon the absolute distinc- 

 tion between mind and matter ; but the complaint will be 

 made that all the functions of life are explained by the 

 brain's molecular and molar action in adjustment to 

 environment, without taking into account the influence of 

 what is admitted to be " mind " — in other words, thought 

 and feeling. The circle, it will be objected, is completed 

 without allowing for the action of at least one important 

 factor. Dr. Mercier, for instance, writes to this effect : — 

 " He who gets himself vaccinated is procuring a change 

 in his constitution adapted to the existence in the outside 

 world of the contagium of small-pox. He is procuring the 

 adjustment of his organism to a set of conditions in his 

 environment." What, asks the objector, is the position 

 of the " he " ? In what relation does this personal pro- 

 noun stand to the organism ? How is it possible to ignore 

 it in the explanation of mental manifestations, or what is 

 called the adjustment of organism to environment ? 



Dr. Mercier advances no further than his predecessors 

 in enabling us to answer these questions. It does not 

 help us to insist upon the "fathomless abyss" that 

 separates mind from matter. We get no further under 

 his guidance than the " rearrangement of molecules in 

 the gray matter of the superior regions of the nervous 

 system." We are told that no process of change in the 

 latter can cause a change of consciousness. To Dr. 

 Mercier's mind this is " unthinkable " ; therefore it is not 

 to be thought of. Equally unthinkable is the proposition 

 that a change in consciousness. can cause a change in 



molecular arrangement. The two changes are, it is said, 

 invariably simultaneous. No doubt, as the author says, 

 the student who grasps these notions has half his diffi- 

 culties surmounted. To overcome difficulties, however, 

 by evading them and confessing our ignorance is some- 

 what dispiriting, and some would think pusillanimous. 

 Dr. Mercier, while granting the existence of mind on the 

 one hand, and movements on the other, will neither allow 

 of such expressions as " psycho-motor " nor give us an 

 equivalent ; for the terms he himself employs exclude the 

 mental factor altogether, although he is forward to admit 

 its existence. There is a break in the circuit, and yet the 

 latter is presented to us as if it were complete. On the 

 remaining links of the chain, the work before us is a 

 painstaking and connected, and therefore valuable, dis- 

 sertation. If this missing link can only be postulated, and 

 cannot be brought within the range of practical psycho- 

 logy, it must be acknowledged that the science is defective 

 in a most essential particular. If the relation between 

 mind and matter is unthinkable, it is not alleged that 

 mind is so, and therefore there does not seem to be any 

 scientific objection to the employment of terms which 

 recognize some causal relation between mind and 

 matter. Still less do we find in the employment of 

 such terms the " blasphemy " which so painfully grates 

 upon the psychologically tender conscience and rigid 

 orthodoxy of our author Seeing, moreover, that there 

 is an appreciable lapse of time between an idea or willing, 

 motion, the whole of which need not be occupied in the 

 transmission through nerve-fibres, there seems at least as 

 much justification for using the term "ideo-motor" as 

 many terms which describe or imply a theory which, like 

 Dr. Mercier's own hypothesis, is confessedly inferential. 

 And further, the expression may be, like a host of others, 

 defective in comprehensiveness and precision, and yet be 

 the most easily understood. 



In conclusion, we would say that Dr. Mercier's work may 

 be read with profit by the class for which it is intended, 

 so long as it is understood that it treats of only one aspect 

 of the relations betu een mind and body, and so long as 

 it does not obscure the recognition of those great truths of 

 cerebral physiology and mental pathology, which are not 

 in dispute, and the teaching of which will continue to 

 enlighten the student of psychology, when the theories of 

 the philosophers are exploded or forgotten. 



POPULAR METEOROLOGY. 

 L Atmosphere — M^tdorologie Populaire. By Camille 

 Flammarion. (Paris: Librairie Hatchette et Cie., 

 1888.) 



THIS is a re-issue of a popular work that first appeared 

 in the year 1872, and which has been enlarged and 

 brought up to date. 



Of all the subjects which are interesting not only to 

 men of science but to people in general, there are few 

 more important than that of the atmosphere, since, 

 without its aerial envelope, our planet would pursue its 

 path round the sun in silence and without life, as is the 

 case with our moon, which bears evidence on its surface 

 of nothing but death and desolation. The c.-istence of 

 an atmosphere makes all the difference in the world to a 



