226 



NATURE 



[July 



1875 



discoverer. That Sanskrit asti is the same as Latin est, 

 that Sanskrit tray as coincided with Latin tres, was pro- 

 bably seen by every scholar who ever opened a Sanskrit 

 grammar. In such cases it can be merely a matter of 

 historical interest to find out who was the first lucky 

 observer. It seems to us one of the chief merits, for 

 instance, of Curtius's Principles of Greek Etymology, that 

 he tells us in most cases, with the greatest conscientious- 

 ness, who were the scholars that first proposed or after- 

 wards defended and substantiated the etymology of 

 different words. Such references involved, no doubt, 

 considerable trouble, and we have no right to expect in a 

 popular work the same learned apparatus. But there are 

 limits here as everywhere else, which no one can overstep 

 with impunity. Every writer, unless his memory is 

 growing weak, knows perfectly well what comes out of his 

 brain, and what comes out of his pockets ; what he has 

 found out himself by dint of hard work, and what he has 

 simply borrowed from others. A large array of footnotes 

 and references may be in many cases a mere pedantic 

 display of learning, but to omit all indications of sources 

 and authorities is hardly defensible, nor can it be excused 

 on the ground of " the compendious cast " in a book where 

 we find, on the second page, references to two of Prof. 

 Whitney's own writings. This is really not a matter of 

 sentiment only, but a matter of serious import in the 

 world of letters. Dates are easily forgotten, and of late 

 it has happened several times that one writer has actually 

 been blamed for having borrowed from another without 

 acknowledgment, whereas he was the creditor and the other 

 the debtor. This leads to awkward explanations, some- 

 times to angry controversies, all of which can be avoided 

 by a frank compliance with rules long recognised in the 

 republic of letters. 



If we confine ourselves to some of the principal subjects 

 treated in Prof. Whitney's new work, would it not have 

 been interesting to know who first pointed out the two 

 motive powers in the growth of language on which Prof. 

 Whitney dwells so largely — Phojietic Decay, and Dialectic 

 Growth or Variation ? 



Again, when an intelligible and sufficient cause was 

 wanted for what was vaguely and metaphorically called 

 Phonetic Decay, who was it that first ventured to suggest 

 that there was nothing mysterious in that process, 

 and that it could be explained in a very homely way 

 as the result of laziness, or of economy of muscular 

 energy ? 



There is one question which Prof. Whitney has treated 

 more fully in this than in his former work, viz., the true 

 meaning of dialect, and the relation between dialects and 

 languages. He exhibits most ably the inevitability of 

 dialectic variety in the very beginning of human speech, 

 and the gradual elimination of dialectic forms in the 

 later growth of language. Were there not others who 

 had strongly insisted on the dialectic nature inherent in 

 language, and had borne the brunt of the battle against 

 numerous unbelievers ? 



We still remember the time when the leading philo- 

 logists in Germany protested against the introduction 

 of scientific Phonetics into Comparative Philology. If 

 at present phonetic and physiological discussions form 

 the introduction and groundwork to every treatise on 

 Comparative Philology, is it not well to remember the 



names of those who were once ridiculed as the founders 

 of the Fonetik Nuz ? 



It may be, as Prof. Whitney asserts, that though 

 Germany is the home of Comparative Philology, the 

 scholars of that country have distinguished them- 

 selves much less in that which We have called the 

 Science of Language. It iftay be easy, as he says in 

 another place, to note remarkable examples of men of 

 the present generation, enjoying high distinction as 

 comparative philologists, who, as soon as they attempt 

 to reason on the wider truths of linguistic science, fall 

 into incongruities and absurdities. But who were the first 

 to conceive a Science of Language as different from Com- 

 parative Philology, though beholden to it for its most 

 valuable materials ? Who first drew the outlines of that 

 science, collected the facts required for its illustration, 

 and established the leading principles for its study ? 

 Prof. Whitney could have answered all these questions 

 better than anybody else, whereas, by his reticence, he 

 may now leave on many of his readers the impression, 

 though no doubt very much against his own will, that the 

 science of language had its cradle in America, and that 

 German, English, and French scholars have added 

 nothing to it, except " incongruities and absurdities." 



After having made these reservations in favour of 

 the founders of and former contributors to the science 

 of language, let us now see in what Prof. Whitney's own 

 contributions to that science consist. We shall have 

 no difficulty in doing this, for he tells us frequently in 

 the course of his writings what he himself has done for 

 rescuing the science of language from the " incongruities 

 and absurdities " of European scholars. 



His first discovery is that Language is an Institution. 

 No one, we believe, would feel inclined to controvert this 

 statement. Language is an institution, and a most excel- 

 lent institution. 



We therefore pass on to the next discovery, which is 

 that Language is aft Itistrutnent. This again is not a very 

 startling assertion. It is well known that Plato, in trying 

 to find out in his own Socratic method what language is, 

 begins with the same assertion. 



" Soc. That which has to be cut has to be cut with some- 

 thing ? 



''Her. Yes. 



" Soc. And that which has to be woven or pierced has to be 

 woven or pierced with something ? 



" Her. Certainly. 



"Soc. And that which has to be named has to be named with 

 eomething ? 



" Her. That is true. 



" Soc. What is that with which we pierce ? 



" Her. An awl. 



" Soc. And with which we weave ? 



" Her. A shuttle. 



" Soc. And with which we name ? 



" Her. A name. 



''Soc. Very good. Then a name is an instrument." 



The only difference between Plato and Prof. Whitney 

 is this, that with Plato this crude definition is but the first 

 link in a long chain of argument, a proposition made 

 simply in order to show its insufficiency ; while Prof. 

 Whitney seems to look upon it as free from all objections. 



The third discovery which Prof. Whitney considers as 

 peculiarly his own is, that everybody learns his langtia^e 

 from his parents. While other writers on the origin of 

 language have " aimlessly expended a surprising amount 



