A^g' 5. 1875] 



NATURE 



269 



prepared to show how a given quantity of molecular 

 motion in nerve-tissue can become transformed into a 

 definable amount of ideation or feeling." Strange that it 

 does not occur to our philosophers that they just leap 

 this impassable gulf from the other side when they talk 

 about a multitude of solid and fluid parts being set in 

 motion by the will, in the same sense in which a spark 

 causes an explosion of gunpowder. Either the volition 

 is itself a mode of motion, which Mr. Fiske solemnly 

 denies, or the circuit is not closed, which he as solemnly 

 asserts it to be. 



The inconsistency and consequent error, to which we 

 have called attention, cause much more widespread con- 

 fusion than might at first be supposed. In one direction 

 we have seen the closed circuit of motion broken in on. 

 In the opposite direction we have elaborate attempts to 

 evolve mind out of matter, all specific and impressive 

 declarations to the contrary notwithstanding. In this 

 direction Mr. Lewes has gone forward with a more un- 

 compromising logic than is to be found in the volumes 

 before us. Mr. Fiske agrees with Mr. Lewes that both 

 " life and mind are processes," but we do not find that he 

 goes on to picture consciousness " as a mass of stationary 

 waves formed out of the individual waves of neural 

 tremors." The evolution philosophy, starting from the 

 primeval nebula, finds every science a specialised part of 

 some more general science. Biology is a specialised part 

 of geology, and psychology is a specialised part of bio- 

 logy. " Mind here appears," says Mr. Fiske, " to be but 

 the highest form of Life," and life, as admirably defined by 

 Mr. Spencer, " is the definite combination of heterogeneous 

 changes, both simultaneous and successive, in corre- 

 spondence with external co-existences and sequences." 

 Truly the study of the higher forms of these phenomena 

 may be called a specialised part of biology. But may we 

 call any adjustment of internal relations to external rela- 

 tions Mind? We think not, and in this Mr. Fiske 

 heartily agrees with us, for he hastens to tell us that 

 " push our researches in biology as far as we may, the 

 most we can ever ascertain is that certain nerve-changes 

 succeed certain other nerve-changes or certain external 

 stimuli in a certain definite order. But all this of itself 

 can render no account of the simplest phenomenon of 

 consciousness." And Mr. Spencer is equally emphatic :— 

 " The thoughts and feeling whick constitute a conscious- 

 ness form an existence that has no place among the exist- 

 ences with which the rest of the sciences deal." But 

 where are we now? If in psychology any part of the 

 phenomena studied are those given directly in conscious- 

 ness, then they are not the phenomena which form a 

 specialised part of biology. Consciousness, then, is not 

 evolved out of the primeval nebula. It creeps in surrep- 

 tiously somewhere in the course of the evolution of 

 organised beings, and appears in man, the highest pro- 

 duct of evolution, as a power guiding his movements. 

 This, to our mind, is the weak point in Mr. Spencer's 

 philosophy. . 



Let us glance at Mr. Fiske's chapter on the Evolution 

 of Mind, which he tells us " was mostly written, and the 

 theory contained therein entirely worked out,before thepub- 

 lication of Part V. of the second edition of Mr. Spencer's 

 ' Principles of Psychology.' " In so far as this so-called the- 

 ory of the evolution of jnind is an account of the evolution 



of the nervous system, it may be open to no serious criti- 

 cism. But what happens is this : From talking of waves 

 of molecular disturbance passing along finished channels 

 and findmg for themselves new courses in lines of least 

 resistance, the language gradually changes ; a process 

 entirely physical, " reflex action, which is unaccompanied 

 by consciousness," is called " the simplest form of psychi- 

 cal life." Instinct is found to be compound reflex action. 

 And in the higher organisms " there will be a number of 

 permanent transit-lines and a number of such lines in 

 process of formation, along with a continual tendency 

 towards the establishment of new ones. The con- 

 sequences of this are obvious. In becoming more and 

 more complex, the correspondence becomes less and less 

 instantaneous and decided. ' They gradually lose their 

 distinctly automatic character, and that which we call 

 instinct merges into something higher.'" What is the 

 something higher into which all these nervous operations 

 merge ? Into mind as we see it in man, who is supposed 

 to perform actions " with the assistance of reason, volition, 

 and conscious memory." 



It is, however, when specially engaged with the con- 

 sideration of voluntary action that the confusion may be 

 said to reach a climax. But Mr. Fiske has no misgiving ; 

 he proceeds, confident that he has clear ideas to expound, 

 and that he is expounding them in clear and consistent 

 language. " Volition," he tells us, " is that transforma- 

 tion of feeling into action which is attended by a conscious 

 comparison of impressions." If feeling may be trans- 

 formed into action, why may not motion be transformed 

 into feeling ? Having written this he cannot well afford 

 to sneer at the materialist. Though mind and motion, as 

 we are often told, have no kinship, yet here are a few 

 sentences which are perhaps expected to help us towards a 

 mental picture of the curious "dynamic process" "where- 

 by feeling initiates action." — " In a complex aggregate, 

 like the human or animal organism, such a state of equili- 

 brium (as the ass between the two bundles of hay) cannot 

 be of long continuance. Sooner or later — either from the 

 greater vividness with which one of the desired objects is 

 mentally realised, or from any one of a thousand other 

 disturbing circumstances down to those of a purely 

 physical nature — one desire will become stronger than 

 the other, and instantly thereupon, the surplus nervous 

 tension remaining after the weaker desire is neutrahsed, 

 will pass into nervous vis viva., or, in other words, volition 

 will take place." It will be almost a sufficient criticism 

 of these statements to place alongside of them a sentence 

 from Mr. Fiske's next paragraph. " To say exphcitly that 

 volition does not follow the strongest motive, is to say 

 implicitly that motion does not always follow the line of 

 least resistance ; which is to deny the persistence of 

 force." With this last statement we agree ; but how is it 

 to be reconciled with the preceding sentences.? Can 

 mental vividness, or anything else not purely physical, 

 either help or hinder motion in following the line of least 

 resistance ? To say so is to deny the persistence of force. 



Having found that philosophers are very like other 

 people, that they are sometimes aUnost as anxious to be 

 thought infallible as to have any inconsistency in their 

 writings pointed out (Mr. J. S. Mill was a grand excep- 

 tion), it may perhaps be as well to say that in bringing 

 together a few passages which seem to us after careful 



