Oct. 7, 1875] 



NATURE 



491 



however rude ; and Mr. Layard's discovery of a crystal 

 magnifying lens at Nineveh indicates that such an instru- 

 ment may have actually been in use.* 



The portion of Chaldean astronomy which was con- 

 cerned with the planets was unnecessarily complicated 

 by the habit of naming them from the fixed stars near 

 which they happened to be at different times of the year, 

 so that the same planet is often spoken of under varying 

 names. Thus Nibaianu was properly Altair, but be- 

 came a very common title of Mars. The number of the 

 fixed stars observed by the Chaldeans was very great, and 

 again suggests the use of something more than the naked 

 eye. The principal stars had individual names, the rest 

 being included in the constellations to which they be- 

 longed. In this way the heavens were mapped out long 

 before the idea of a terrestrial atlas had suggested itself. 

 The identification of the Chaldean constellations and 

 fixed stars is of course a work of considerable difficulty, 

 but the modern representatives of several of them have 

 now been determined, and with the help of these and 

 fresh astronomical texts, there is every reason to hope 

 that our knowledge of the celestial globe] of the Baby- 

 lonians will be as complete as it is in the^case of the 

 Greeks and Romans. 



A. H. Sayce 



COMTE'S PHILOSOPHY 



The Positive Philosophy of Aiiguste Co?nie, freely trans- 

 lated and condensed. By Harriet Martineau. In 

 Two Volumes, 8vo. Second Edition. (London: 

 Triibner and Co., 1875.) 



THE first edition of Miss Martineau's version of the 

 " Positive Philosophy " was published in the 

 autumn of 1853. The considerable space of time which 

 has since elapsed cannot have been due to any defect in 

 the adapter's work. So excellently were the translation 

 and condensation accomplished by Miss Martineau, that 

 Comte substituted her two volumes for his own six 

 volumes, and since Comte's death the work has actually 

 been retranslated into French. It does not give us a 

 great idea of the demand for Comte's works in England, 

 when we find that twenty-two years intervene between 

 the first and second editions. At last, however, the work 

 is re-issued in two handsome volumes, but we are not in- 

 formed that any alteration at all has been made either in 

 the matter or language of the work, and I have not been 

 able to detect a difference even in a word. The appear- 

 ance of this new edition nevertheless affords an oppor- 

 tunity for a few remarks upon the value and pretensions 

 of the " Positive Philosophy," 



It has been asked "What's in a name?" As regards 

 the positive philosophy, it may be answered that there is 

 a great deal in the name. The name Positive is an 

 admirable question-begging epithet. Everything which 

 Comte wished to stamp with his approval, and make a 

 part of his system, he called positive, and a formidable 

 list of new names was invented. We have Positive 



* A broken tablet I, have come across seems to record a transit of Venus 

 across the sun. It is to be hoped that Mr. Smith will before long succeed in 

 bringing to England the remainder of the Kouyunjik Library. At present 

 a tablet is often broken off at its most interesting part, while the correspond- 

 ing fragment is still lying under the soil on the banks of the Tigris. 



Philosophy, Positivism, Positivity, Positive Method, 

 Positive Polity, Positive Morality, and even Positive 

 Practices. It would be much more correct to say 

 Comte's Philosophy, Comtism, Comte's Method, Comte's 

 Polity, Comte's Practices, because I believe it is impos- 

 sible to attribute any invariable meaning to the word 

 Positive, as used by Comte, except that it meant what 

 belonged to his system. Nevertheless, the word was of 

 inestimable value to Comte, because it enabled him to 

 represent all his own views, some being of the most 

 peculiar character, as the natural outcome of the] Baco- 

 nian Philosophy. 



We frequently find Comte stating, in the frankest 

 manner, that there was nothing new in the idea of a 

 positive philosophy. Bacon and Descartes (vol. ii., pp. 381, 

 386, &c.) were the two great legislators of the philosophy. 

 Even the common sense of ordinary thinkers contains all 

 the elements of Positivism, provided that absurd meta- 

 physical and theological ideas do not obscure them. 

 Through Hume, Brown, and a few other philosophers, 

 the pure method of positivism descended to Comte, 

 whose mission it was to develop a complete system of 

 positive thinking. When we attempt to find a clear 

 definition of what the positive method is, it appears to be 

 simply synonymous with the scientific method of induc- 

 tion, resting upon facts. Having thus mvested himself 

 with the prestige of whatever is best in the results of 

 modern science, Comte proceeds to deliver at full length 

 his own ideas of the origin and progress of civilisation, 

 the grounds of morality, the best form of government, 

 and the coming system of religious worship. All these 

 ideas, being called positive, are of course the necessary 

 outcome of the pure scientific_method. 



The following is one of the clearest statements,'which I 

 can find, of the nature of the positive method (vol. ii. 

 p. 424) :— " The Positive Philosophy is distinguished from 

 the ancient ... by nothing so much as its rejection of 

 all inquiring into causes, first and final; and its con- 

 fining research to the invariable relations which constitute 

 natural laws. . . . We have accordingly sanctioned, in 

 the one relation, the now popular maxim of Bacon, that 

 observed facts are the only basis of sound speculation ; so 

 that we agree to what I wrote a quarter of a century ago, 

 — that no proposition that is not finally reducible to the 

 enunciation of a fact, particular or general, can offer any 

 real and intelligible meaning. On the other hand, we 

 have repudiated the practice of reducing science to an 

 accumulation of desultory facts, asserting that science, as 

 distinguished from learning, is essentially composed, not 

 of facts, but of laws, so that no separate fact can be in- 

 corporated with science till it has been connected with 

 some other, at least by the aid of some justifiable hypo- 

 thesis." Now this passage not only contains very 

 good sense, but it may be regarded as a most clear state- 

 ment of what correct scientific method aims at, the ascer- 

 tainment of general laws. But there is nothing whatever 

 in this to distinguish the positive'method from that pursued 

 by all scientific inquirers who. have any share of the spirit 

 of Galileo, or Gilbert, or Newton, or Hooke, or Lavoisier, 

 or Laplace, or Faraday. The question really is, then, 

 whether Comte, having properly formulated the method 

 of scientific inquiry, knew how to apply it in regions 

 where he was not led by greater minds. There is no 



