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NATURE 



\OcL 7, 1875 



doubt that Comte possessed a remarkably extensive and 

 generally accurate knowledge of mathematics, astronomy, 

 and many portions of physics and chemistry, as deve- 

 loped in his day. The first part of his work is therefore 

 comparatively free from objection, and consists to a great 

 extent of an interesting and able review of the progress of 

 physical science. 



Incidentally I may reniark, that Comte,'while continu- 

 ally sheltering himself under Lord Bacon's great name, 

 appears to have known little or nothing of Bacon's works. 

 If there was one thing which Comte abjured, it was the 

 inquiry into causes, whereas Bacon quotes approvingly 

 the old dictum that " truly to know is'to know by causes.'' 

 Every reader of the " Novum Organum " must be aware 

 that Bacon deals not only with causes, but with still 

 vaguer ideas. Forms, Natures, Essences, terms so meta- 

 physical that even the editors of Bacon hardly pretend to 

 make out clearly what they mean. The following is a 

 characteristic extract from the second book of the "Novum 

 Organum " (Aphorism iv.) : — " The true form is such that 

 it deduces the given'nature from some source of essence 

 which is inherent in things, and is better known to nature, 

 as they say, than Form is. And so this is our judgment 

 and precept respecting a true and perfect axiom for know- 

 ledge, that another nature be discovered which shall be 

 convertible with the given nature, and yet be a limitation 

 of a more general nature, like a true genus." It is 

 possible that Bacon knew what he meant, but his own 

 employment of his "true and perfect axiom" was no 

 more happy than I hold Comte's application of his 

 positive method to be. 



It is of course impossible to show in a single brief 

 article how crude and unscientific were Comte's results 

 when he applied his method to new fields ^of research, 

 especially in Sociology. One of his supposed greatest 

 discoveries was the philosophical law of the succession of 

 three states : the primitive theological state, the transient 

 metaphysical, and the final positive state. This is one 

 of those vague and hasty generalisations which have the 

 worst scientific vice of being incapable of precise verifica- 

 tion. The theory can be stretched, like india-rubber, to 

 cover any difficulties. If we object that the Hebrews 

 were from the earliest historical times Monotheists, and 

 have so continued to the present day, we are told that 

 they were prematurely monotheistic, and are left to 

 imagine that they will ultimately become positivists. 

 What sufficiently condemns Comte's laws of evolution is 

 that they led him away from the doctrines of evolution aj 

 now established by Darwin and Spencer, and their fol- 

 lowers. Comte was well acquainted with Lamarck's views, 

 which he discusses in Book V. chap. 3, coming to the 

 unfortunate conclusion (vol. i. p. 345) that in every view 

 Lamarck's conception is to be condemned, and "that 

 species remain essentially fixed through all exterior varia- 

 tions compatible with their existence." In the beginning of 

 the fifth chapter of the sixth book, too, we find a passage 

 which entirely cuts Comte off from any share in the 

 sociological doctrines of Spencer. " Gall's cerebral theory," 

 he says (vol. ii. p. 105}, " has destroyed for ever the meta- 

 physical fancies of the last century about the origin of 

 man's social tendencies, which are now proved to be 

 inherent in his nature, and not the result of utilitarian 



considerations." It is highly remarkable that, though the 

 germs of the new philosophy of evolution had been put 

 afloat by the elder Darwin, Lamarck, Malthus, and others, 

 both Comte and his admirer, John Stuart Mill, entirely 

 failed to appreciate their value. 



There is no doubt that Comte had very wide and 

 general views as to the possibility of creating great bodies 

 of social science, described by various combinations of 

 the adjective Positive, such as Positive Morality, Positive 

 Polity ; but I quite deny that he had any true conception 

 of the proper way of going about the work. It is im- 

 possible that he should have, because he altogether 

 abjured and ridiculed that branch of mathematical science, 

 namely, the theory of Probability, by which alone we can 

 approach the scientific investigation of the complex con- 

 dition of a nation. He says (vol. ii. p. 416) : " Mathema- 

 ticians drop the supposition of natural laws as soon as 

 they encounter phenomena of any considerable degree of 

 complexity, and especially when human action is in any 

 way concerned ; as we see by their pretended calculation 

 of chances, through a special application of analysis — an 

 extravagance which is wholly incompatible with true posi- 

 tivity, but from which the vulgar of our algebraists still 

 expect, after a century of wasted labour, the perfecting of 

 some of the most difficult of human studies." It becomes 

 hardly possible to treat Comte's pretensions seriously, 

 when we contemplate this intellectual freak by which he 

 rejects the theory which is becoming more and more the 

 basis of all exact science. The more exact and perfect, 

 in fact, a science becomes, the more complete is the appli- 

 cation of the rules^derived from the theory of probability. 

 In the computations at Greenwich and other astronomical 

 observatories, they are used in almost every reduction. 

 Nothing is more accurate than a good trigonometrical 

 survey, and yet there is no work to which the theory of 

 chance is more elaborately applied. In proportion as 

 chemistry and physics become exact and methodical 

 sciences, they also resort to the theory of chance, as we 

 see in the researches of Sir B. C. Brodie, or the elaborate 

 labours of Prof. W. H. Miller on standard weights and 

 measures. 



As to social science, the Method of Means and the law 

 of divergence from an average, founded on the theory of 

 probability, are simply the alpha and omega of scientific 

 method. We cannot stir a step in any branch of statisti- 

 cal inquiry without drawing an average, and we cannot 

 do this unless we accept the theory which Comte ridiculed. 

 Quetelet is the true founder of exact social science, and 

 his long labours consisted in the unwearied appUcation of 

 the doctrine of chance to vast bodies of statistical facts. 

 In Mr. Francis Galton's works we find the same true 

 method carried out with perfect appreciation of its value. 



I might go on to point out, again, that the one branch 

 of social science which most early assumed a partially 

 scientific form, namely, political economy, was that to 

 which Comte entirely refused his imprimatur. He never 

 would allow it to be called Positive, though he predicted 

 that in the positive era the world would be governed by 

 bankers. Criticism, however, is disarmed when we con- 

 sider the vagaries to which the positive method is sup- 

 posed to have led its great expositor. 



W. Stanley Jevons 



