September i6, 1920] 



NATURE 



95 



their interest there seems little doubt. Austria would 

 still be able to derive some of her raw materials and 

 foodstuffs from the Succession Suites, and she would 

 have, in addition, a great German area in which she 

 would find scope for her commercial and financial 

 activities. Not only would Austria find a market for 

 her industrial products in Germany, but she would 

 also become the great trading centre between Germany 

 and south-east Luropc. 



The absorption of Aystria in Germany is opposed 

 Ijv France, mainly because she cannot conceive, that 

 her great secular struggle with the people on the 

 other side of the Rhine will ever come to an end, 

 and she fears the addition of 6,500,000 to the popula- 

 tion of her ancient enemy. But quite apart from 

 the fact that Germany and .Austria cannot permanently 

 be prevented from following a common destiny if 

 they so desire, and apart from the fact that politically 

 it is desirable they should do so with at least the 

 icit assent of the'.Mlied Powers rather than in face 

 t their avowed hostility, there are reasons for 



inking that any danger to which France might be 



■ \ix)sed by the additional man-power given to Ger- 

 many would be more than compensiited for by the 

 ;iltere<l political condition in Germany herself. Vienna 

 would form an effective counterpoise to Berlin, and 

 .ill the more so because she is a great geographical 



■ eiitre, while Berlin is more or less a political 

 1 reation. The South German people have never 

 loved the latter city, and to-day they love her less 

 ih.-m ever. In Vienna they would find not only a 

 kindred civilisation with which they would be in sym- 

 pathy, but also a political leadership to which they 

 would readily give heed. In such a Germany, divided 

 in its allegiance between Berlin and Vienna, Prussian 

 animositv to France would be more or less neutralised. 

 Nor would Germany suffer disproportionately to her 

 gain, since in the intermingling of northern efficiency 

 with southern culture she would find a remedy for 

 much of the present discontents. When the time 

 1 omes, and .Austria seeks to ally herself with her kin, 

 we hope that no impassable obstacle will be placed 

 in her way. 



The long and .1^ mi unsettled controversy on the 

 limits of the Italian kingdom illustrates very well the 

 difficulties which may arise when geographical and 



■ fhnical conditions are subordinated to considerations 

 f military strategy, history, and sentiment in the 



I' termination of national boundaries. The annexa- 

 tion of the .Mto .Adigc has been generally accepted as 

 ncvitablc. It is true that the population is Grerman, 



lit here, as in Bohemia, geographical conditions 



iipear to speak the final word. Strategically also 

 he frontier is good, and will do much to allay 

 I Milan anxiety with regard to the future. Hence, 



Ithough ethnical conditions are to some extent 

 .;norcd, the settlement which has been made will 



lobablv be a lasting one. • 

 On the east the natural frontier of Italy obviously 



ins across th<' uplands from some point near the 



istcrn extremity of the Carnic .Alps to the .Adriatic. 



he pre-war frontier was unsatisfactory for one 



• ason, because it assigned to Austria the essentially 

 I Lilian region of the Lower Isonzo. But once the 



wlands are left on the west, the uplands which 

 ■rder them on the cast, whether .Alpine or Karst, 

 i.irk the natural limits of the Italian kingdom, and 



• yond a position on them for strategic reasons the 

 I Lilians have no claims in this direction except what 



•ley ran establish on ethnical grounds. In Carniola 



le Slovenes are in a large majority, and in Gori/ia 



:liey also form the bulk of the population. On the 



tlier hand, in the town and district of Trieste the 



NO. 2655. VOL. 106] 



Italians predominate, and they also form a solid 

 block on the west coast of Istria, though the rest 

 of that country is peopled mainly by Slovenes. It 

 seems to follo.w, therefore, that the plains of the 

 Isonzo, the district of Trieste, and the west coast 

 of Istria, with as much of the neighbouring upland 

 as is necessary to secure their safety and communica- 

 tions, should be Italian, and that the remainder 

 should pass to the Jugo-Slavs. The so-called Wilson 

 line, which runs from the neighbourhood of Tarvis 

 to_ the mouth of the .Arsa, met these requirements 

 fairly well, though it placed from 300,000 to 400,000 

 Jugo-Slavs under Italian rule to less than 50,000 

 Italians, half of whom are in Fiume itself, trans- 

 ferred to the Jugo-Slavs. .Anv additional territory 

 must, by incorporating a larger alien element, be a 

 source of weakness and not of strength to Italy. 

 To Fiume the Italians have no claim beyond the fact 

 that in the town itself thev slightlv outnumber the 

 Croats, though in the double town of Fiume-Sushak 

 there is a large Slav majority. Bevond the senti- 

 mental reasons which they urge in public, however, 

 there is the economic argument, which, perhaps 

 wisely, they keep in the background. So long as 

 Trieste and Fiume belonged to the same empire the 

 limits within which each operated were fairly well 

 defined, but if Fiume becomes Jugo-Slav it will not 

 only prove a serious rival to Trieste, but will prevent 

 Italy from e.xercising absolute control over much of 

 the trade of Central Europe. Its development is 

 more fully assured as the one great port of Jugo- 

 slavia than under any other form of government. 

 With regard to Italian claims in the Adriatic little 

 need be said. To the Dalmatian coast Italy has no 

 right either on geographical or on ethnical'grounds, 

 and the possession of Pola, Valona, and some of the 

 islands gives her all the strategic advantages which 

 she has reason to demand. 



Of the prospects of Jugo-Slavia it is hard to speak 

 with any feeling- of certainty. With the exception 

 of parts of Croatia-Slavonui'and of southern Hun- 

 gary, the country is from the physical point of view 

 essentially Balkan, and diversity rather than unity is 

 its most pronounced characteristic. Ethnic affi'nitv 

 forms the real basis of union, but whether that union 

 implies unity is another matter. It is arguable that 

 repulsion from the various peoples— Magyars, Turks, 

 and .Austrians — by whom they have been oppressed, 

 rather than the attraction of kinship, is the force 

 which has brought the Jugo-Slavs together. In any 

 case, the obstacles jn the wav of the growth of a 

 strong national feeling are many. Religious differ- 

 ences- are not wanting, and cultural conditions 

 show a wide range. To build up out of elements in 

 many respects so diverse a common nationality with- 

 out destroying what is best in each will be a long 

 and laborious task. Economic conditions arc not 

 likely to be of much assistance. It is true that they 

 are fairly uniform throughout Jugo-Slavia, and it is 

 improbable that the economic interests of different 

 regions will conflict to anv great extent. On the 

 other hand, since each region is more or less self- 

 supporting, they will naturally unite into an economic 

 whole less easily than if there had been greater 

 diversity. What the future holds for Jugo-Slavia it Is 

 as yet impossible to say; but the country is one of 

 great potentialities, anil a long period of political 

 rest might render possible the development of an 

 important .State. 



This brings mc to my conclusion. I have en- 

 dcivouretl to consider the great changes which have 

 been made in Europe, not in regard to the extent to 

 which they do or do not comply with the ranon<) of 



