48 THE COMPETITION FOR LAND 



and above the value of the zemindar's share as first 

 calculated. The same argument was applied with less 

 reason in cases where the selling price of the crop 

 turned out more than usual, though here the zemindars 

 got the benefit just as much as the tenant, and in pro- 

 cess of time the dishonest and grasping landlords, 

 without any just ground whatever, extended the system 

 till they made dliala into a demand always claimable 

 against the tenant, unless the crops turned out much 

 worse than had been estimated, and further levied it 

 on a sliding scale, which invariably brought up their 

 demand to just about as much as they could possibly 

 squeeze out of the tenant. 



' It is very clear evidence, I think, of how much the 

 zemindars have got the better of the tenants in this 

 part of the country — that demands which are clearly 

 illogical and unjust have become almost universal. 

 Such, for instance, is the demand for kharch on 

 amaldari at the same rates as on actual batai^ though 

 the zemindar is put to little or no expense in it where 

 (as is usual here) the tenant pays him the value of his 

 share in money. So is the demand for kharch on 

 zabti QTO^s, which is nearly universal ; so, though less 

 apparent, is the enhanced rate of kharch taken from 

 tenants paying favourable rates in batai ; and so most 

 emphatically is the custom of taking dhala, which is 

 very common.' 



But the evil of the Metayer system in India is not 

 confined to the exactions by which the landlord eludes 

 the restraint of custom. The very argument which 

 the Ricardian economist urged against the system — 

 viz., that it weakened the incentive to industry — is 

 constantly found in the mouths of practical settlement 

 officers, who had little interest in vindicating abstract 

 theories of economics. 



Mr. Smeaton in his report on the Hasanpur par- 

 gannah writes :* 



* 'Moradabad Settlement Report, 1881.' 



