26 KANT'S UNIVERSAL NATURAL HISTORY 



bring it about. And are we not thereby moved to ask, 

 why matter must just have had laws which aim at order 

 and conformity? Was it possible that many things, each 

 of which has its own nature independent of the others, 

 should determine each other of themselves just in such 

 a way that a well-ordered whole should arise therefrom ; 

 and if they do this, is it not an undeniable proof of the 

 community of their origin at first, which must have been 

 a universal Supreme Intelligence, in which the natures of 

 things were devised for common combined purposes? 



Matter, which is the primitive constituent of all things, 

 is therefore bound to certain laws, and when it is freely 

 abandoned to these laws it must necessarily bring forth 

 beautiful combinations. It has no freedom to deviate 

 from this perfect plan. Since it is thus subject to a 

 supremely wise purpose, it must necessarily have been 

 put into such harmonious relationships by a First Cause 

 ruling over it ; and there is a God^ just because nature 

 even in chaos cannot proceed otherwise than regularly and 

 according to order. 



I have such a good opinion of the honest judgment 

 of those who will do my Essay the honour of examining 

 it, that I am certain that the reasons now adduced, if 

 they do not remove all anxiety about the injurious con- 

 sequences of my system, will at least put the purity of 

 my intention beyond doubt. If there are, nevertheless, ill- 

 disposed zealots who regard it as a duty worthy of their 

 sacred calling to attach prejudicial interpretations to 

 innocent opinions, I am persuaded that their judgment 

 will have the opposite effect of their intention with 

 reasonable men. Moreover, I am not to be deprived of 

 the right which Descartes has always enjoyed with just 



