326 Animal Life and Intelligence. 



but that, in BO far as there enter into the idea of the 

 soldier or the tree elements which have been isolated by 

 analysis, just in so far does the word " soldier " or " tree " 

 stand for a concept. How far a word stands for a percept, 

 and how far there enter conceptual elements, depends to 

 a large extent on the level of intelligence of the hearer. 

 The moment educated and intellectual folk begin to think 



means of an abstract name," Mr. Romanes (" Mental Evolution in Man," p. 

 36) has suggested the term " recept." In the photographic psychology which 

 he adopts, the percept is an individual and particular photograph, the recept a 

 generalized or composite photograph. " The word ' recept,' " he says, " is seen 

 to be appropriate to the class of ideas in question, because, in receiving such 

 ideas, the mind is passive." This, it will be observed, is in opposition to the 

 teaching of this chapter, in which the activity of the mind in perception has 

 been insisted on. Mr. Romanes's recepts answer in part to what I have 

 termed constructs, which, as we have seen, are, as a rule, from the first general 

 rather than particular, and in part to concepts reached through analysis. Mr. 

 Romanes, for example, speaks of ideas of principles (e.g. the principle of the 

 screw) and ideas of qualities (e.g. good-for-eating and not-good-for-eating) as 

 recepts (p. 60). On the other hand, Mr. Mivart ("The Origin of Human 

 Reason," p. 59; see also his work "On Truth") terms such generic affections 

 " sensuous universals." It may be well to append Mr. Romanes's and Mr. 

 Mivart's tabular statements. 



Mr. Romanes. 



1 General, abstract, or notional = Concepts. 

 Complex, compound, or mixed = Recepts, or 

 generic ideas. 

 Simple, particular, or concrete = Memories of per- 

 cepts. 



Mr. Mivart. 



, ( General or true universals = Concepts. 



"\Particularorindividual = Percepts. 



Groups of actual experiences ) j c 



aggpss: W^ 



Groups of simply juxtaposed \ _ Sense-perceptions, 

 actual experiences / or sencepts. 



In Mr. Mivart's terminology, the representations of the lower group are 

 " mental images " or " phantasmata." The term " consciousness " is by him 

 restricted to the higher region of ideas, the term " consentience " being applied 

 to the faculty by which cognitive affections .'are felt, unified, and grouped 

 without consciousness. There is a difference in kind, according to Mr. Mivart, 

 between " consentience " and " consciousness ; " and the former could therefore 

 never develop into the latter, nor the latter be evolved from the former. For 

 this reason (because of the philosophy it is intended to carry with it) I shall 

 not employ the word "consentience," which would otherwise be a useful 

 term. 



1 



