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CHAPTEE IX. 



MENTAL PROCESSES IN ANIMALS : THEIR POWERS OF PERCEPTION 

 AND INTELLIGENCE. 



Two things I have been especially anxious to bring out 

 prominently in the foregoing chapter : first, that the 

 world we see around us is a joint product of two factors 

 the outward existence, on the one hand, and our active 

 mind on the other; and secondly, that our mental pro- 

 cesses and products fall under two categories on the one 

 hand, perception, giving rise to percepts, perceptual 

 inferences, and intelligence, and on the other, conception 

 (involving the analysis of phenomena), giving rise to con- 

 cepts, conceptual inferences, and reason. 



Now, I am anxious that the former to take that first 

 should be laid hold of and really grasped as an indubitable 

 fact. It is implied in the word " phenomena," that is to say, 

 appearances. We can only know the world as it appears 

 to us ; and the world is for us what it appears. There is 

 nothing here in conflict with common sense ; the practical 

 reality of phenomena is altered no whit. Suppose philosophy 

 tries to get behind phenomena, so as to get a peep at the 

 world beyond. Suppose Carlyle tells us that " All visible 

 things are emblems ; what thou seest is not there on its 

 own account ; strictly taken, is not there [as such] at all ; 

 matter exists only spiritually, and to represent some idea 

 and body it forth." Has he altered the reality of the 

 phenomena themselves ? Not in the smallest degree. 

 Suppose the materialist gives us his analysis of pheno- 

 mena. Are not the phenomena he analyzes still the same, 

 still equally real ? No matter how far he analyzes pheno- 



