Mental Evolution. 467 



the subjective side to motion are conscious. ( I shall venture, 

 therefore, to coin a word * to meet my present need. 



It is generally admitted that physical phenomena, in- 

 cluding those which we call physiological, can be explained 

 (or are explicable) in terms of energy. It is also generally 

 admitted that consciousness is something distinct from, 

 nay, belonging to a wholly different phenomenal order from, 

 energy. And it is further generally admitted that con- 

 sciousness is nevertheless in some way closely, if not 

 indissolubly, associated with special manifestations of 

 energy in the nerve-centres of the brain. Now, we call 

 manifestations of energy "kinetic" manifestations, and we 

 use the term " kinesis " for physical manifestations of this 

 order. Similarly, we may call concomitant manifestations 

 of the mental or conscious order " metakinetic," and may 

 use the term " metakinesis " for all manifestations belong- 

 ing to this phenomenal order. According to the monistic 

 hypothesis, every mode of kinesis has its concomitant mode of 

 metakinesis, and when the kinetic manifestations assume the 

 form of the molecular processes in the human brain, the meta- 

 kinetic manifestations assume the form of human consciousness. 

 I am, therefore, not prepared to accept the horn of Mr. 

 Wallace's dilemma in the form in which he states it. All 

 matter is not conscious, because consciousness is the meta- 

 kinetic concomitant of a highly specialized order of kinesis. 

 But every kinesis has an associated metakinesis ; and 

 parallel to the evolution of organic and neural kinesis there 

 has been an evolution of metakinetic manifestations culminating 

 in conscious thought. 



Paraphrasing the words of Professor Max Miiller,t I 

 say, "Like Descartes, like Spinoza, like Leibnitz, like 

 Noire, I require two orders of phenomena only, but I define 

 them differently, namely, as kinesis and metakinesis. 



* I consider that an apology is needed for the coinage of this and of two 

 or three other words, such as " construct," " isolate," and " predominant." I 

 can only say that in each case I endeavoured to avoid them, but found that I 

 could not make my meaning clear, or briug out the poiut I wished to emphasize 

 without them. 



t " Science of Thought," pp. 286, 287. 



