Mental Evolution. 471 



tion to one or two which seem at once obvious and yet 

 easily met. 



It maybe asked What advantage has such a view over 

 realistic materialism ? Why not assume that neural pro- 

 cesses, when they reach a certain complexity, give rise to 

 or produce consciousness ? 



First of aU, I think, the objection raised by Mr. Wallace, 

 in the passage before quoted, to materialism is unanswer- 

 able. Secondly, realistic materialism ignores the fact that 

 kinetic manifestations for us human-folk are phenomena of 

 consciousness. To this we will return presently. Thirdly, 

 realistic materialism, and any view which regards the 

 physical series as one which is independent of the psychical 

 accompaniments, and which regards consciousness as in 

 any sense a by-product of neural processes, are open to an 

 objection which was forcibly stated by the late Professor 

 Herbert.* " It is clearly impossible," he says, *' for those 

 . . . who teach that consciousness is [a by-product and] 

 never the cause of physical change, to dispute that the 

 actions, words and gestures of every individual of the 

 human race would have been exactly what they have been 

 in the absence of mind ; had mind been wanting [had the 

 by-product never emerged], the same empires would have 

 risen and fallen, the same battles would have been fought 

 and won, the same literature, the same masterpieces of 

 painting and music would have been produced, the same 

 religious rites would have been performed, and the same 

 indications of friendship and affection given. To this 

 absurdity physical science [realistic materialism] stands 

 committed." I believe that Professor Herbert's argument, 

 of which this passage is a summary, is, as against realistic 

 materialism, sound and unanswerable. Finally, as Pro- 

 fessor Max Miiller has well observed, t " Materialism may 

 in one sense be said to be a grammatical blunder ; it is a 

 misapplication of a word which can be used in an oblique 



* T. M. Herbert, "The Kealistic Assumptions of Modern Science 

 Examined," 2nd edit., p. 123. 



t " Science of Thought," p. 571. 



