134 THE DA WN OF MIND. 



marked that we are able to give them names, and use 

 them as landmarks in psyche-genesis. Yet taken even 

 as representing a rough order it is a circumstance to 

 which some significance must be attached that the 

 tree of Mind as we know it in lower Nature, and the 

 tree of Mind as we know it in a little child, should be 

 the same tree, starting its roots at the same place, and 

 though by no means ending its branches at the same 

 level, at least growing them so far in a parallel direc- 

 tion. 



Do we read these emotions into the lower animals 

 or are they really there ? That they are not there in 

 the sense in which we think them there is probably 

 certain. But that they are there in some sense, a 

 sense sufficient to permit us cautiously to reason 

 from, seems an admissible hypothesis. No doubt it 

 takes much for granted, — partly, indeed, the very 

 thing to be proved. But discounting even the enor- 

 mous limitations of the inquiry, there is surely a 

 residuum of general result to make it at least worth 

 making. 



If we turn from emotional to intellectual develop- 

 ment, the parallelism though much more faint is at 

 least shadowed. Again we find a list of intellectual 

 products common to both Animal and Man, and, again 

 an approximate order common to both. It is true, 

 Man's development beyond the highest point attained 

 by any animal in the region of the intellect, is all but 

 infinite. Of rational judgment he has the whole mo- 

 nopoly. Wherever the roots of Mind be, there is no 

 uncertainty as to where, and where exclusively, the 

 higher branches are. Grant that the mental faculties 

 of Man and Animal part company at a point, there 



