96 GENERAL VIEW AND BASIS OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH. 



conduct in other respects only by such means. It is, 

 however, a grave question as to how far men are justi- 

 fied in believing or propagating as settled truths ideas 

 which are not yet confirmed, or which cannot at present 

 be either proved or disproved. Respecting the duty 

 of using our reason in forming our beliefs, Locke has 

 remarked : ' He that believes without having any reason 

 for believing may be in love with his own fancies, but 

 neither seeks truth as he ought nor pays the obedience 

 due to his Maker, who would have him use those discern- 

 ing faculties He has given him to keep him out of mistake 

 and error. He that does not this to the best of his 

 power, however he sometimes lights on truth, is in the 

 right but by chance, and I know not whether the luckiness 

 of the accident will excuse the irregularity of the pro- 

 ceeding. This at least is certain, that he must be 

 accountable for whatever mistakes he runs into.' 1 And 

 since the great universe of verified truth affords an 

 almost unlimited scope for rational belief, there is less 

 excuse for indulgence in uncertain ideas. 



Uniformity of opinion upon un demonstrable subjects 

 is not practicable, and perhaps not desirable, but in 

 demonstrable subjects it is a necessary result of the evi- 

 dence. ' To be indifferent which of two opinions is true 

 (says Locke) is the right temper of the mind, that 

 preserves it from being imposed on, and disposes it to 

 examine with that indifferency till it has done its best to 

 find the truth ; and this is the only direct and safe way 

 to it. But to be indifferent whether we embrace false- 

 hood or truth is the great road to error.' 2 ' Prove all 

 things, and hold fast to that which is good,' is excellent 



1 Human Understanding, book iv. ch. xrii., ' On Reason.' 

 = G. C. Lewis, Influence of Authority in flatten of Opinion, 

 p. 40. 



