RESPONSIBILITY FOR BELIEFS. 97 



advice, but many ideas must wait for ages before they 

 can be proved, and many probably will never be proved 

 at all. Our uncertainty of the truthfulness of an idea 

 depends not simply upon its being a result of inference, 

 but upon the circumstance that it has not been derived, 

 either directly or by means of inference, from our ex- 

 perience. That which has not been derived from expe- 

 rience is hypothesis. Belief founded upon ignorance is a 

 dangerous kind of belief, and it is a hazardous practice 

 to treat an unproved and improvable statement as if it 

 were a verified truth. We, however, frequently believe 

 more firmly an uncertain statement than one we can fully 

 prove, and we commonly do so because we wish to believe 

 it, and partly because we know it cannot be disproved. 

 However true a dogma or hypothesis in science may be in 

 itself, it is to us a dead statement, until, by investigation, 

 it is proved to be a living truth. Unprovable beliefs are 

 also often dangerous, because disputes respecting them are 

 a fertile source of strife, injure the moral feelings, and lead 

 to no trustworthy conclusion. 



The truth or falsity of scientific belief is often a 

 matter of the highest importance to us, and in such cases 

 we should spare no trouble to determine it. The forma- 

 tion of our true beliefs depends upon the selection of true 

 ideas, and the selection of ideas is an act performed by 

 the intellect. In selecting or choosing ideas we first 

 compare them, observe their similarities and differences, 

 then infer, by an act of the reason, which are the most 

 suitable, and decide upon them. Neither the feelings nor 

 the will can select ideas, because they cannot compare 

 things -, the feelings can only blindly yield to the ideas 

 which most strongly excite them, and the will can only 

 excite a stronger mental effort to carry into effect ideas 

 which are already in the mind. We often think we 



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