102 GENERAL YIEW AND BASIS OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH. 



before the time of Newton, and when first proposed was 

 objected to as being contrary to all experience ! That 

 also which to all of us is at present inconceivable is not 

 necessarily untrue. 



As in the past our beliefs have been largely founded 

 upon appearances, and have many of them been reversed 

 by deeper knowledge, so may we reasonably expect, in 

 accordance with the principle of uniformity of nature, that 

 the same process will continue to operate in the future^ 

 and that even some of our most attractive beliefs (except- 

 ing those which are logically absolute or demonstrable in 

 science) will suffer a similar fate. And as we should 

 avoid error as well as accept truth, so should we entertain 

 undemonstrable and un verifiable statements in such a way 

 that, when they have served their purpose in the progress 

 of nature, we may resign them without a struggle. 



The statement that we are compelled by the circum- 

 stances of life to believe much that is false, is based upon 

 the fact of gradual human progress and development, and 

 our consequent transitional state. The amount of truth 

 in it would be much less if men in general had more self- 

 denial, and were much more careful to suspend their belief 

 in all cases of absence of evidence. The sources of com- 

 pulsory false belief lie not in external nature, but in our- 

 selves, and may many of them be traced originally to the 

 imperfections of all our physical and mental powers. 

 Whilst also nature is practically infinite, all our faculties 

 are extremely finite, and very imperfectly educated. Man's 

 mind is a mirror of nature, but a mirror full of defects. 



To be imperfect and more or less in error are our 

 usual states. That it is our bodily and mental conditions 

 which are the chief original causes of our numerous 

 false ideas, is shown in several ways. Our beliefs respect- 

 ing nature are largely formed by our unconnected impres- 



