SCIENTIFIC INVENTION. 363 



In the act of invention during original research, 

 whether it be that of forming new hypotheses, new questions 

 :o be tested, or new causes, explanations, or theories, we 

 try to imagine as many possibilities or suppositions as we 

 3an, and then select the best one. 



4 In every inductive inference an act of invention is 

 requisite.' ' The invention of a new conception in every 

 inductive inference is generally overlooked.' 'It is a 

 thought which, once breathed forth, permeates all men's 

 minds. All fancy they nearly or quite knew it before.' 1 



' In order, then, to discover scientific truths, suppo- 

 sitions consisting either of new conceptions, or of new 

 combinations of old ones, are to be made, till we find one 

 which succeeds in binding together the facts. But how 

 are we to find this ? ' ' For this purpose we must both 

 carefully observe the phenomena, and steadily trace the 

 consequences of our assumptions till we can bring the two 

 into comparison.' 2 



4 The character of the true philosopher is, not that he 

 never conjectures hazardously, but that his conjectures 

 are clearly conceived, and brought into rigid contact with 

 facts. He sees and compares distinctly the ideas and the 



things the relations of his notions to each other and to 



phenomena. Under these conditions it is not only excusable, 

 but necessary to him to snatch at every semblance of 

 general rule, to try all promising forms of simplicity and 

 symmetry. Hence, advances in knowledge are not com- 

 monly made without the previous exercise of some bold- 

 ness and license in guessing, The discovery of new truths 

 requires, undoubtedly, minds careful and scrupulous in 

 examining what is suggested ; but it requires, no less, 

 such as are quick and fertile in suggesting. What is 



1 Whewell, Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, vol. ii. pp. 217, 218. 



2 Ibid. vol. ii. pp. 210, 211. 



