INTRODUCTION. 65 



said to have grown out of these vague and scattered 

 beginnings by the attempt to conduct them according to 

 some method, and to unite them into a complete and con- 

 sistent whole. Philosophy may thus be defined as specula- 10. 



Philosophy 



tion carried on according to some clear method, and aiming defined. 

 at systematic unity. 1 Both science and philosophy may 

 be called methodical thought, but the word system is 

 applicable only to the higher and more advanced forms of 

 philosophic thought which aim at unity and completeness. 

 We have thus arrived at a second division of our sub- 

 ject. In the first we have to consider thought merely as 

 a means to an end ; in the second we have to consider it as 

 its own object, as a reflection on itself, carried on with the 

 object of knowing its own origin, its laws, its validity, of 

 testing its powers, and with the end and aim of gaining 

 certainty, completeness, and unity. The whole of this n. 



. . . Division of 



great division of thought I shall comprise under the the book. 



1 This view of the nature and mind, and they frequently entangle 



object of Philosophy agrees with themselves, owing to the above-men - 



Lotze's definition (vid. ' Grundzuge ' tioned defect, in contradictions, in- 



der Logik,' Leipzig, 1883, 88): asmuch as they are unable to fix the 



'The common culture of life and ; limits of validity of these to some 



the separate sciences contain a num- ' extent contradictory assumptions, 



ber of suppositions the origin of "Now we may formally define 



which is obscure to us, because they the task of Philosophy as follows : 



have been very gradually formed that it is an endeavour to import 



within us through the comparison unity and connectedness into the 



of many experiences, or because scattered directions of cultured 



they have first become conscious by thought, to follow each of these 



means of such experiences, have j directions into its assumptions and 



then received definite names and be- j into its consequences, to combine 



come habitual without having been j them all together, to remove their 



subjected by us to any examina- [ contradictions, and to form out of 



tion as to the reason, the sense, and them a comprehensive view of the 



the extent of their validity. In this world ; mainly, however, to subject 



way science and life make use of the those ideas which science and life 



notions of cause and effect, of matter j regard as principles to a special 



And. force, of means and end, of free- ' scrutiny, in order to determine the 



dom and necessity, of matter and limits of their validity." 



VOL. I. E 



