THE ATOMIC VIEW OF NATURE. 



383 



of nature. Towards the end of the last century, and all 

 through the present one, this view of things natural, which 

 I have called the Astronomical view, has exerted a great 

 fascination over scientific minds : especially in the mathe- 

 matical schools of France and the Continent it has been 

 a leading idea in scientific thought. It has been ex- 

 tended into molar and molecular physics, and has in 

 these led to some very extraordinary and ingenious 

 theories. In England, this astronomical view of Nature 

 has, in the course of the present century, been received 



what has been done since Newton 

 in real science will probably con- 

 vince us that the definition is safe 

 and sufficient. It means the an- 

 alysis of phenomena as to their 

 appearance in space and their se- 

 quence in time. Both can, in con- 

 sequence of the small number of 

 elementary relations on which 

 arithmetic, geometry, and dynam- 

 ics are built up, be reduced to 

 or described in a small num- 

 ber of elementary terms or concep- 

 tions, the alphabet of all science. 

 To show how in every instance the 

 terms of this alphabet are to be put 

 together, in order to correspond to 

 any phenomenon, is all the explana- 

 tion we can give. Objections have 

 been raised to KirchofFs definition 

 by Du Bois-Reymond (" Gothe und 

 kein Ende " in 'Red en,' vol. i. 

 p. 434), inasmuch as it does not 

 define the difference between the 

 descriptive (historical) and the ex- 

 act (mathematical) sciences of na- 

 ture ; but the difference is really 

 maintained if we demand a com- 

 plete description. Natural history 

 only affords an incomplete descrip- 

 tion. The only complete descrip- 

 tion is that afforded by a mathe- 

 matical formula in which the con- 

 stants are supplied by observation. 

 This permits us to calculate those 



features or phases of phenomena 

 which are hidden from our obser- 

 vation in space or in time. An 

 objection to the view which identi- 

 fies physics with mechanics, seems 

 implied in Mach's remarks con- 

 tained in the last chapter of his 

 very thoughtful book ' Die Me- 

 chanik in ihrer Entwickelung ' 

 (Leipzig, 1889). According to his 

 view, the aim of exact science is 

 not necessarily to give mechanical 

 explanations or descriptions of phe- 

 nomena, inasmuch as temperature, 

 electric potential, &c., are just as 

 simple elements of natural phenom- 

 ena as mass and motion. It seems, 

 nevertheless, that exact measure- 

 ments are only possible in the 

 data of time and space. Assum- 

 ing that a complete and simple 

 description admitting of calcula- 

 tion is the aim of all exact science, 

 it is evident how much and how 

 little we may expect from science. 

 We shall not expect to find the 

 ultimate and final causes, and 

 science will not teach us to under- 

 stand nature and life. The search 

 after ultimate causes may perhaps 

 be given up as hopeless ; that 

 after the meaning and significance 

 of the things of life will never be 

 abandoned : it is the philosophical 

 or religious problem. 



