ON THE MOKPHOLOGICAL VIEW OF NATURE. 205 



If we try to specify a little more closely the agencies 

 and interests that were at work in bringing about this 

 very marked change, which, like every change of the 

 kind, has been reflected by the altered vocabulary of 

 our languages, we come upon two distinct influences 



adopted, the present work only re- 

 tains that one principle which, in 

 some form or other, appears in 

 every attempt towards classifica- 

 tion the difference between the 

 abstract and the concrete or actual. 

 The two original philosophical sys- 

 tems which France and England 

 in the course of the century 

 have produced, the positivist phil- 

 osophy of Comte and the phil- 

 osophy of evolution of Herbert 

 Spencer, have both dealt elabor- 

 ately with the problem of the 

 classification of the sciences. In 

 this they betray their descent from 

 the philosophy of Bacon and their 

 practical tendencies. It is mainly 

 in the interests of teaching that 

 the division of the sciences is of 

 importance ; and so here it has 

 proved to be indispensable, but 

 also, not unfrequently, narrowing 

 and harmful. German philoso- 

 phers, who have generally been 

 more influenced by the traditions 

 of Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, 

 have attached less importance to 

 the rigid divisions. The result 

 has been that in Germany, more 

 than in any other country, those 

 modern sciences have grown up 

 which cultivate the borderland 

 that separates the existing well- 

 marked provinces which are artifi- 

 cially kept up by the older chairs 

 at the universities. Examples of 

 this are the new sciences of physio- 

 logical psychology and of physical 

 chemistry, both brilliantly and for 

 the first time represented at the 

 university of Leipzig. The two 

 great conceptions, however, which 

 have probably done more than any 

 others to break down the old con- 

 ventional landmarks that kept 



j the sciences asunder, the concep- 

 i tion of energy and the idea of de- 

 I scent, were first prominently put 

 forward in this country. The 

 classical treatise on the division of 

 the sciences in the widest sense is 

 the ' De Augmentis Scientiarum ' 

 of Lord Bacon. An important and 

 original work on the subject is 

 Andre" Marie Ampere's ' Essai sur la 

 Philosophic des Sciences, ou Ex- 

 position analytique d'une Classifica- 

 tion naturelle de toutes les Con- 

 naissances humaines' (1834). An 

 analysis of the book is given in 

 WheweU's ' Philosophy of the In- 

 ductive Sciences,' vol. ii., Book 12. 

 Ampere's classification, on the 

 model of that in botany, is sym- 

 metrical and dichotomous. Aug. 

 Comte's classification, contained 

 in the second " Le9on " of the 

 ' Cours de Philosophic positive ' 

 (1830, vol. i.), is termed by its 

 author " une e"chelle " or " une hier- 

 archic encyclope"dique. " Mr Her- 

 bert Spencer, in an essay ' On the 

 Genesis of Science ' (1854), repub- 

 lished with additions in the third 

 volume of his ' Essays ' (1874), criti- 

 cised Comte's attempt to classify the 

 sciences "serially." He more than 

 any other thinker has assisted in 

 breaking down the older idea, which 

 was very prominent in many classi- 

 fications of the great French natur- 

 alists, the idea of the subordin- 

 ation of things in nature, of the 

 " ^chelle des etres," and the corres- 

 ponding conception of an hierarchy 

 of the sciences. In the place of 

 this serial arrangement, a genea- 

 logical arrangement, under the 

 specific term of evolution, was in- 

 troduced, and the sciences were 

 co-ordinated according to their 



