ON THE GENETIC VIEW OF NATURE. 301 



strated in the completest manner the truth of epigenesis. 

 In fact, he had recognised development as the " sole basis 

 of zoological classification ; while in France Cuvier and 

 Geoffrey St Hilaire were embittering each other's lives 

 with endless merely anatomical discussions and replica- 

 tions, and while in Germany the cautious study of nature 

 was given up for the spinning of Natur-philosophies and 

 other hypothetical cobwebs." 1 



The position which Karl Ernst von Baer occupies in 

 the history of science and thought is in many respects 

 interesting and unique. He lived early enough in the 

 century to experience the full influence of Cuvier's 

 authority, and lived long enough to witness the great 

 change which Darwin's writings brought on in all the 

 natural sciences ; whereas his great contemporary, 

 Johannes Miiller, passed away before the name of 

 Darwin was known outside of his own country. In 

 unison with Miiller, and yet in an independent manner, 

 he effectually liberated German science from the undue 

 influence of the speculative school. And he has, prob- 

 ably more than any other great naturalist, recognised 

 the importance of the three aspects which a contempla- 

 tion of natural objects forces upon us : the apparent or 

 real fixity of certain forms (the morphological view), 

 the continued and orderly change 2 of these forms (the 

 genetic view), and the apparent or real existence of a 



1 Huxley in Taylor's ' Scientific far as observations now give material 



Memoirs,' New Series, p. 176. for inferences, a transformation of 



a Very important in this respect certain original forms of animals in 



is a lecture delivered by von Baer the succession of generations is very 



in 1834, with the title 'Das all- probable, but only to a limited ex- 



gemeinste Gesetz der Natur in aller tent " (p. 60), a view which von 



Entwickelung ' (reprinted in the Baer maintained to the end against 



Brunswick edition, vol. i. p. 39 extreme Darwinism (see p. 37). 

 sqq.) " We must conclude that, so 



