136 



PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT. 



flexible to lead to a variety of emendations and inter- 

 pretations, forming a very suitable opportunity for 

 oral discussion and combined work. 1 This was recog- 



1 " On a philosophical founda- 

 tion Hermann appears to us as 

 the tpi\6\oyos KUT' Qo\riv, as a 

 philologist in the real sense of the 

 word, i.e., as the propounder of the 

 \6yos in its twofold and inseparable 

 nature, ratio and oratio, thought 

 and word in one ; the former re- 

 presenting the inner, the latter 

 the outer side of the activity 

 which constitutes the essence of 

 Mind. A thought becomes fully 

 apparent only when it is spoken ; 

 the word without the full content 

 of the thought is an empty sound. 

 From this peculiarity of Hermann's 

 nature, combined with his absolute 

 truthfulness, there follows with 

 psychological necessity his indiffer- 

 ence towards everything that can- 

 not be clearly thought and spoken, 

 . . . and even out of this peculiarity 

 there sprang with the same neces- 

 sity the comprehensive conception 

 which Hermann had of his science, 

 and which he followed throughout. 

 Language is to him the highest 

 artistic production of the human 

 mind ; hence it appears, in spite 

 of its natural origin, frequently 

 as the result of conscious incisive 

 thought. Thus voice and language 

 are the picture of mind and 

 life. Language exists, therefore, 

 not only to be empirically used, but 

 also to be rationally understood ; it 

 lias its definite laws, which it is 

 the object of science to discover in 

 general and in detail. In this way 

 Hermann conceived of language at 

 a time when there could yet be no 

 mention of a general science of 

 language. The languages of the 

 two civilised peoples of antiquity 

 foremost the language of the 

 Greeks are as such alone worthy 

 of study, but still more so as the 

 means of giving us an under- 



standing of the greatest masters 

 who have ever lived, for their 

 written monuments are the greatest 

 works of art which we possess ; and 

 they are, further, likewise the best 

 indeed, the only means by which 

 we can understand also the other 

 monuments ; they alone speak to us ; 

 other monuments without them re- 

 main to us dumb. Thus the correct 

 understanding and the thorough- 

 going interpretation of the ancient 

 authors is the main task of philo- 

 logy ; criticism and exegesis are 

 indissolubly united. ... In this 

 sense also Hermann is the model of 

 the genuine philologist." ('Gott- 

 fried Hermann,' by H. Koechly 

 (1874), p. 13, &c.) In the same 

 sense a much later writer says : 

 "There still remains what the 

 nineteanth century, especially also 

 in Germany, has considered to be 

 the very kernel of philology criti- 

 cism and interpretation of authors. 

 To this also has reference the 

 much-lauded philological method, 

 which came to be appraised as 

 being the best preparation for 

 all the mental sciences, just as 

 formerly Latin used to be con- 

 sidered in the schools. . . . The 

 belief in the possession of a method 

 as an ever-ready sorcerer's wand 

 was the most precious gift that 

 the numerous pupils of Ritschl re- 

 ceived from this teacher, whose fas- 

 cinating personal activity can only 

 be compared with that of Her- 

 mann. He who reads, e.g. , Ritschl's 

 ' Parerga ' and Haupt's earliest 

 ' Berlin Programmes ' has indeed 

 the sense of a quite peculiar con- 

 fidence through a dialectic which 

 certainly produces at times quite 

 insignificant results ; at times also 

 such as have since been found to be 

 erroneous. These writings will as 



