OF THE SOUL. 



199 



Germany, and which were echoed in a more sober 

 manner in French and English literature, mark probably 

 one of the most important changes that have come 

 over philosophical thought in the course of the century, 

 it seems appropriate to start the history of philosophical 

 thought with an account of the problems which centre 

 in the word soul. 1 



1 In order to assist my readers, 

 I anticipate what will be more fully 

 explained in this and following 

 chapters, by defining the great 

 change which I refer to in the 

 text, in a telling phrase invented 

 by Lange. He speaks of a " psy- 

 chology without a soul. " This truly 

 indicates the position which most 

 English psychologists before the 

 middle of the century had already 

 though unconsciously and gener- 

 ally without denying the existence 

 of the soul adopted, and which 

 has become almost universal among 

 psychologists since that time. It 

 corresponds to similar positions 

 taken up in physics and biology 

 since they have submitted to rigor- 

 ous scientific treatment. The 



former does not now concern itself 

 with a definition of matter nor the 

 latter with a definition of life ; see, 

 e.g., the Appendix to P. G. Tait's 

 'Properties of Matter,' quoted in 

 an earlier volume of this History 

 (vol. ii. pp. 388-425), and Huxley's 

 article on "Biology" in the 9th ed. of 

 the ' Ency. Brit. ' Earlier biologists, 

 such as Cuvier, attempted to give 

 a definition of life. This task, as 

 also the definition of matter, is now 

 admitted to be not a scientific but 

 a philosophical problem. In the 

 same way, since psychologists have 

 very generally put aside the ques- 

 tion as to the essence of the soul, 

 confining themselves to the descrip- 

 tion of psychical processes and 

 phenomena, psychology has become 

 an independent science, and is, as 

 such, an introduction to, but hardly 



a branch of, philosophy. It is, 

 however, well to remark, that we 

 have in Germany a prominent ex- 

 ponent of the older position in Prof. 

 J. Rehmke ; see notably his small 

 treatise, ' Die Seele des Menschen ' 

 (3rd ed. 1909), which is divided 

 into two sections on the " Essence " 

 and on the "Life of the Soul." 

 Whilst revising the text of this 

 chapter, which was written six 

 years ago, I came across Prof. 

 Henri Bergson's " Huxley Lecture " 

 (delivered in Birmingham, 29th May 

 1911), and also the Report of his 

 four Lectures " On the Soul," de- 

 livered October 1911 at University 

 College, London. In the first- 

 named lecture he complains that 

 philosophers have gone away from 

 vital questions such as : "What are 

 we ? " " What are we doing here ? " 

 " Whence do we come and whither 

 do we go ?" (see ' Hibbert Journal,' 

 October 1911, p. 24). Accordingly, 

 M. Bergson, ever since the appear- 

 ance of his two earlier works (' Les 

 Donne"es Imme'diates de la Con- 

 science,' 1889, and 'Matiere et 

 Memoire,' 1896), has been consid- 

 ered to represent a new school of 

 psychology; see, e.g., M. Boirac in 

 the ' Grande Encyclopedic,' article 

 " Psychologic" : " Bergson et toute 

 la jeune e"cole qui le suit, maintien- 

 nent e"nergiquement 1'iudependance 

 et I'originalite' de la psychologic en 

 face des sciences proprement dites 

 auxquelles on ne peut, selon eux, 

 1'assimiler sans la de"figurer ou 

 plutot sans la de"truire." 



