OF THE SOUL. 



205 



more in his 'Scientific Psychology' (1824), he em- 

 phasised experience as the main foundation of the 

 doctrine of the soul, but he significantly added to this 

 principal foundation also metaphysics arid mathematics. 

 The object of the metaphysical inquiry was to arrive at a 

 clear and consistent notion of the essence of the soul. 

 The mathematical treatment was introduced in analogy 

 with the then current mechanical foundations which had 

 been gained for the physical sciences. Impressed with 

 the fact that the inner life consisted in a continual move- 

 ment of ideas (called in German Vorstellungen *), which 



1 It is probably through Herbart's 

 influence that the recent school of 

 introspective psychology in Eng- 

 land, of which Prof. James Ward 

 may be considered the leader and 

 Prof. Stout the best known repre- 

 sentative, has abandoned the older 

 term Ideas used since the time of 

 Locke for the more appropriate 

 term Presentations. It is evidently 

 a translation of the German "Vor- 

 stellungen," and permits of introduc- 

 ing the distinction between the 

 mental fact or process of presenting 

 and that which is presented ; cor- 

 responding to the double meaning 

 of the word " Vorstellung " as a 

 psychical phenomenon on the one 

 side and its definite content on the 

 other. To a foreigner the use of 

 the term " Vorstellungen " in Her- 

 bart's psychology with its two 

 aspects occasions as much difficulty, 

 whilst it affords at the same time as 

 much helpful insight, as the term 

 "Anschauung" in the philosophy of 

 Kant and some of his successors. 

 The rendering of the latter term by 

 intuition was much less successful 

 than the rendering of the former by 

 presentation. Both terms have this 

 in common, that they suggest a 

 double aspect. " A presentation 

 may be considered in two points of 



view, either as having intrinsically 

 a certain qualitative content, or, 

 mechanically, as a condition of 

 change in the total mental system 

 of which it forms a part. It is in 

 the former way, not in the latter, 

 that presentations are usually re- 

 garded by all who are not students 

 of psychology. From this point of 

 view, attention is fixed either on re- 

 semblance and difference and other 

 relations constitutive of the pres- 

 ented content, or on its relation 

 to objects which it is in some way 

 supposed to represent. In either 

 case there will appear to be an 

 entire absence of anything that can 

 be called agency in the presenta- 

 tions considered. Variations in our 

 idea of a thing do not alter the 

 thing itself, and resemblance and 

 difference are not in any sense 

 modes of interaction. Most persons 

 find it difficult to grasp the con- 

 ception of a psychological mechan- 

 ism, because they habitually regard 

 presentations purely as having a 

 presented content. Nevertheless, 

 the mechanical standpoint is a 

 legitimate one, provided that its 

 nature and limitations are duly 

 recognised. Presentations act and 

 react on each other in manifold 

 ways. They exclude each other 



