292 PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT. 



unity and connectedness ; and in this regard the dis- 

 continuous appears as an obstacle which has to be over- 

 come. On the other side it is just this discontinuity 

 (difference of time, of degree, of place, of quality, of 

 individuality) which everywhere, in the realms of science 

 as well as of life, brings something new, releases the 

 bound-up forces, and places before us the great tasks. 

 Neither of the two elements appears prima facie to be 

 the only legitimate one, and it is of undoubted interest 

 to follow up their mutual relations from different points 

 of view. In the philosophy of the nineteenth century 

 the importance of the continuity problem stands out 

 characteristically. In the first half of the century phil- 

 osophical Idealism insisted in its own way on the 

 continuity of existence, and looked down upon empirical 

 science on account of its fragmentary character, whilst 

 positivism (as upheld by Comte and Stuart Mill) empha- 

 sised the discontinuity of the different groups of pheno- 

 mena. Towards the end of the century it is Eealism 

 which, with the help of the evolution hypothesis, urges 

 continuity, whereas the idealistic school is inclined to 

 lay stress upon the inevitable discontinuity of our 

 knowledge. In this way the different directions of 

 thought change their position in the great contest 

 through which truth is to be won." 1 



It is evident from this that the highest psychological 

 problems lead us out of psychology into other and more 

 general regions of thought. Not only are we told that 

 psychology proper has nothing to do with the soul, i.e., 

 with the essence of the inner life, but wherever this 



1 Hoffding, ' Philosophische Probleme,' p. 5. 



