326 



PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT. 



the mathematical form of knowledge is to be found in 

 Spinoza, though the latter in the course of his meta- 

 physical expositions arrives at the conception that 

 discursive knowledge must, in its highest form, become 

 intuition, mediated or rational knowledge having finally 

 to pass into intuitive or immediate knowledge. 1 This 

 idea was revived or independently enunciated by many 



and their connections. (' Medi- 

 tations on Cognition, Truth, and 

 Ideas,' 1684). "Accordingly the 

 a priori or eternal geometrical 

 or metaphysical truths are both 

 clear and distinct. On the other 

 side the a posteriori or actual truths 

 are clear but not distinct. The 

 former are therefore fully trans- 

 parent, accompanied by the con- 

 viction of the impossibility of their 

 opposite ; with the latter the 

 opposite is conceivable. With the 

 former, intuitive certainty rests on 

 the principle of contradiction ; with 

 the latter, their possibility, which is 

 proved by their actual reality, 

 requires further explication through 

 the principle of sufficient reason. 

 ... In course of its further develop- 

 ment this distinction acquired, for 

 Leibniz, metaphysical importance. 

 He distinguished between absolute 

 necessity, which implies the logical 

 impossibility of the opposite, and 

 a conditioned necessity which is 

 merely factual. He divides the 

 principles of things into those the 

 opposite of which is inconceivable, 

 and those of which it is conceiv- 

 able " (Windelband, ' Geschichte 

 der Philosophic,' 4th ed., p. 334). 

 Prof. Windelband also shows that 

 Leibniz originally considered that 

 the difference between conceptions 

 which are clear and those which 

 are in addition fully denned or 

 transparent applied only to the 

 human or finite intellect, whereas 

 in the Divine Intellect this differ- 

 ence did not exist ; but that in the 



sequel, in order not to fall into the 

 absolute necessitarianism of Spinoza, 

 he emphasised the difference of 

 necessary and contingent truths. 

 Leaving out of consideration, as 

 alien to the subject of this chapter, 

 the metaphysical aspect, we may 

 say that Leibniz approached the 

 problem of the difference of certitude 

 and precision of knowledge, i.e., 

 the difference between knowledge 

 which we acquire (by observation 

 and reflection) and ultimate con- 

 victions which we must possess. 



1 With Spinoza "the cognition 

 of all finite things and states leads 

 to two highest conceptions exten- 

 sion and consciousness ; they both 

 acquire a higher metaphysical im- 

 portance than finite things possess, 

 they are the attributes [of the 

 absolute substance], the finite 

 things are only their modes. But 

 as abstract thought rises from 

 these ultimate distinctions to the 

 most general, the ens generalissi- 

 mwrn, the conception of the latter 

 loses all definite content and there 

 remains only the empty form of 

 substance. And for Spinoza the 

 Deity is All and as such Nothing. 

 His theology follows entirely the 

 lines of mysticism. . . . To this 

 corresponds also his threefold 

 theory of knowledge, which places, 

 beyond perception and reflection, 

 intuition as the immediate appre- 

 hension of the eternal emanence of 

 all things out of God, cognition sub 

 specie (eterni " (Windelband, loc. 

 cit., p. 342). 



