336 PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT. 



certainty and truth. The outcome of their labours, how- 

 ever, was not very encouraging. It seemed rather as if 

 the attempt to unify and harmonise had succeeded only 

 in showing up more clearly the existing differences. At 

 the same time, the growing volume of actual knowledge 

 attained in the different empirical sciences, and especi- 

 ally the increasing precision which the introduction of 

 the mathematical methods afforded, made these sciences 

 more self-reliant and dogmatic. On the other side, the 

 vagueness and seeming uncertainty of all philosophical 

 speculations referring to the general order of the world 

 and the destiny of human life produced in many think- 

 ing minds doubt and indifference, and among believers 

 the conviction that salvation could only be found by a 

 strong dogmatic assertion of the truths of traditional 

 faith, which were guaranteed by their historical origin 

 and confirmed to the believer by an inner light which 

 was not assisted by philosophical reasoning, 

 si. The existence of this dogmatism on both sides, as well 



New way 



Kant edby as ^ ne g row i n doubt and indifference with regard to the 

 most important questions which confront the serious 

 thinker, led, in the mind of Kant, to what seemed to 

 him to be a new way out of the existing dilemma and 

 perplexities. It seemed to Kant that, before entering 

 on a discussion of the higher problems of philosophy 

 problems which he termed transcendent it would be 

 necessary, systematically and methodically, to examine 

 into the processes of observation, experience, and reason- 

 ing. Although this had already been, to some extent, 

 undertaken by Locke, and before him by Descartes, it 

 had not been undertaken for the definite purpose of 



