OF KNOWLEDGE. 



339 



concerned, he was hampered by the formalism in the 

 logic as well as in the psychology of his day, both of 

 which he gratefully accepted. 



In spite of the strong recommendation of the induc- 

 tive methods by Bacon, the science of logic dealt, at that 

 time, mostly only with deductive and syllogistic reason- 

 ing, without attempting to analyse the processes by which 

 knowledge was extended in the natural sciences, such as 

 the methods of inference and of proof. And Kant's 

 psychology was the empirical faculty-psychology of the 

 school of Wolff, improved by some of his followers, 

 such as Tetens and Baumgarten. 



The theory of Knowledge had been independently 

 attacked by Locke and Hume ; but Kant was able to 

 go beyond the position they had reached, for he had 

 before him the significant and suggestive answer which 



38. 



Relation to 

 Locke, 

 Hume, and 

 Leibniz. 



phoronomy (kinematics), of dyn- 

 amics (kinetics), and of physics 

 (gravitational and other) were none 

 of them clearly distinguished. That 

 in each of these sciences an addi- 

 tional notion, principle, or axiom is 

 involved was not clear to thinkers 

 certainly not to philosophers of 

 that age, nor for a long time after. 

 Kant identified numbering with the 

 temporal series in analogy with 

 geometry, which deals with spatial 

 series or dimensions. The purely 

 phoronomical science of " kine- 

 matics," of which Kepler's Laws 

 were the most brilliant example, 

 was not separated from " kinetics," 

 which is based on Galileo's experi- 

 ments and Newton's laws of motion, 

 implying the conceptions of force 

 and inertia (mass). Again, New- 

 ton's natural philosophy, which to 

 Kant was the ideal of a science, 

 brought in the notion of attrac- 

 tion (action at a distance), a purely 



empirical fact, based upon a syn- 

 thesis of Kepler's and Galileo's 

 discoveries. To these notions Kant 

 added in his cosmological theories 

 the correlated notion of repulsion, 

 following the vaguer theories of 

 the ancients, and suggested also 

 by elementary electric and mag- 

 netic phenomena. The modern 

 conception of energy was, so far 

 as mechanical phenomena are con- 

 cerned, anticipated by Leibniz, who 

 suggested a measure for mechanical 

 action. That the celebrated con- 

 troversy which raged over this 

 matter between the Leibnizians 

 and the Cartesians had been 

 finally settled by d'Alembert in 

 his 'Trait4 de Dynamique' (1743) 

 seems to have been unknown to 

 Kant ten years later. In the last 

 chapter we have seen how Kant 

 was also influenced by the tradi- 

 tional psychology of his day. 



