OF KNOWLEDGE. 373 



t 



gained by intellectual intuition, i.e., by a kind of in- 

 spiration which not infrequently degenerated into guess- 

 work. 1 



In the conventional histories of philosophy, the ex- 

 position of Hegel's method and doctrine follows immedi- 

 ately and naturally after the exposition of the systems of 

 Fichte and Schelling; but for our purposes, since we are at 

 present interested in the problem of knowledge, we must 

 desist for the moment from entering into an exposition 

 of Hegel's ideas, and this for the following reason. It is 

 quite true that Hegel's philosophy is much occupied with 

 the question of knowledge, but it does not contain what 

 we nowadays call a theory of knowledge. If it solves 

 the problem of knowledge at all, it solves it not by an 

 analysis of existing knowledge, but by unfolding the new 

 and higher kind of knowledge compared with which the 

 actually existing knowledge was not considered to be 

 real knowledge at all, but only a lower stage of merely 

 apparent or preliminary knowledge. Desiring to estab- 

 lish a philosophical creed, a reasoned and consistent 

 view of life and its great questions, Hegel, as little 

 as his predecessors Fichte and Schelling, considered it 

 worth while to spend much time and labour in analys- 

 ing such forms of existing knowledge as had proved 

 themselves incapable of meeting the wants of the age, 

 i.e., of solving the great practical questions. In fact, the 



1 The most lucid exposition of 

 Hegel's relation to the philosophy 

 of his predecessors, and of their 

 merits and defects, is to be found in 

 the latter part of his posthumous- 

 ly published lectures on 'History 



of Philosophy' (see 'Werke,' vol. 

 xv. p. 534 to end). This course 

 he delivered as the editor, K. L. 

 Michelet, tells us in the Preface 

 ten times during the last twenty- 

 five years of his life. 



