430 



PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT. 



e. revive those inquiries which were once termed rneta- 



Rcviv&l of 



Meta- physical, and which for some time had been neglected 



physics. r * 



and wellnigh forgotten. 1 



It is significant to see how in the 

 later editions of the ' Encyclopaedia 

 Britannica,' as was the case with 

 Logic so also in Metaphysics, the 

 Aristotelian predilections of the 

 Oxford school have again asserted 

 themselves. The article on the 

 subject by Prof. T. Case opens 

 with the following significant sen- 

 tence : " Side by side with psy- 

 chology, the science of mind, and 

 with logic, the science of reasoning, 

 metaphysics is tending gradually to 

 assert its ancient Aristotelian posi- 

 tion as the science of being in 

 general. Not long ago, in Eng- 

 land at all events, metaphysics was 

 merged in psychology. But with 

 the decline of dogmatic belief and 

 the spread of religious doubt about 

 the creation and government of the 

 world ; as the special sciences also 

 grow more general and the natural 

 sciences become more speculative 

 about matter and force, evolution 

 and teleology ; men begin to wonder 

 again, like the Greeks, about the 

 nature and origin of things, and 

 half unconsciously discover that 

 they are metaphysicians. Nor 

 must we expect any great differ- 

 ence between the old and the new 

 methods of dealing with these pro- 

 blems when the causes have been 

 similar." 



In France the revival of meta- 

 physics may be traced to the influ- 

 ence of Renouvier and Jules 

 Lachelier (1832-1875). Like Ham- 

 ilton and Caird in this country, 

 Renouvier and Lachelier were 

 influenced by the Criticism of 

 Kant. It is interesting to note 

 also that France alone possesses 

 since 1893 a periodical which 

 prominently puts forward the meta- 

 physical interest : the ' Revue de 

 Me"taphysique et de Morale. ' 



1 So far as Germany is concerned, 

 the metaphysical interest in the 

 sense of ontology was kept alive 

 for a considerable period almost 

 exclusively by the philosophy of 

 Lotze, and the revival of this in- 

 terest attaches itself significantly 

 to a renewed study and ap- 

 preciation of Lotze's position, 

 especially of his doctrine of valid- 

 ity and value. To understand 

 the most recent movements of 

 thought in this direction we may 

 consult two publications to which 

 I have referred on former occa- 

 sions. The first is the Kuno 

 Fischer 'Festschrift' (1904), the 

 second the ' Systematische Philo- 

 sophic ' (1907). The former con- 

 tains no chapter on Metaphysics, 

 the latter contains a chapter on 

 Metaphysics by W. Wundt : against 

 this the former contains a chapter 

 on ' Philosophy of Religion ' by 

 Troltsch ; in the other this sub- 

 ject is wanting. But the article 

 by Windelband on Logic in the 

 earlier work is important as show- 

 ing how the treatment of the 

 problem of knowledge is gradually 

 leading over to the metaphysical 

 problem of reality ('Festschrift,' 

 vol. i. p. 183 sqq.). In the latter 

 work we find in the chapter on 

 Metaphysic no reference to the 

 problem of reality and the truly 

 Real. Metaphysics is there treated 

 as poetical, dialectical, or critical, 

 and, as examples of these three 

 aspects which run through ancient 

 and modern philosophy, we are sur- 

 prised to find Haeckel as repre- 

 senting poetical and Ostwald dia- 

 lectical metaphysics, whereas Mach 

 is selected as representing the 

 critical position. In reference to 

 the recent history of Metaphysics, 

 the name of Lotze does not occur, 



