OF REALITY. 



435 



0. 

 Modern 



In the last chapter I have shown how the philosophy 

 of Kant has influenced all discussions bearing upon the 

 problem of knowledge which have appeared during the 

 nineteenth century. The modern theory of knowledge 

 seems to centre in Kant. I have now to report that 

 Kant occupies a similarly central position with regard 

 to the problem of reality. In fact, Kant's immediate fol- Ji^ 

 lowers, and among them certainly those who exercised, 

 at the time, the greatest influence on philosophic and 

 general thought abroad, made the problem of reality the 

 most prominent theme of their speculations. With them 

 philosophy became again dogmatic and assertive, instead 

 of remaining critical as Kant had desired it to be. The 

 critical side of the new doctrine was cultivated by some of 

 the less known disciples of Kant, and was raised to the 

 prominence which it deserves only after the constructive 

 effort had seemingly exhausted itself i.e., since the middle 

 of the century. With this change of interests which, as 

 I have shown before, had a deeper historical meaning 

 beyond the region of philosophical speculation, the 



ously be some acquaintance with 

 the nature of the goal. Nay, the 

 would-be sceptic, who presses on us 

 the contradictions of our thoughts, 

 himself asserts dogmatically. For 

 these contradictions might be ulti- 

 mate and absolute truth, if the 

 nature of the reality were not known 

 to be otherwise. " No better proof 

 could be given of the renewed in- 

 terest which the problem of reality 

 commands than the remarkable ap- 

 preciation of Mr Bradley's own 

 work, as shown by the appearance 

 in less than ten years of four edi- 

 tions and the important literature 

 which deals with it (see the 10th 

 ed. of Ueberweg's ' Grundriss, ' 



part iv., p. 524). It is significant 

 that this literature is almost en- 

 tirely English and American. The 

 student of Lotze cannot help being 

 reminded, almost at every turn of 

 Mr Bradley's many-sided argument, 

 of sundry passages as well as of the 

 general tone of Lotze's writings. 

 If, and as, the study of Lotze is 

 resumed in his own country, there 

 is no doubt that the important 

 philosophical writings of the Oxford 

 school will have to be appreciated 

 in their orginality : a beginning of 

 this is to be found in the closing 

 chapter by Windelband in ' Grosse 

 Denker' (vol. ii.) 



