482 



PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT. 



33. 



Schopen- 

 hauer. 



addition to this pluralism in his solution of the problem 

 of Reality, 1 Herbart draws a sharp distinction between 

 theoretical and practical philosophy. Our ideas regard- 

 ing the ultimate nature of Reality have nothing what- 

 ever to do with the principles of our conduct. The 

 latter must be sought quite independently in ultimate 

 judgments of ^Esthetical and Ethical approval and dis- 

 approval, and of the corresponding value or worth which 

 we attach to things or actions. 



With Herbart, Schopenhauer is in agreement on one 

 point. 2 He looks the question of the ultimate nature 



1 We may say that the solution 

 of the problem of Reality remains 

 with Herbart on a lower level. 

 The common-sense view of Reality 

 and the notions developed by sci- 

 ence lead him to conceive of the 

 phenomenal world as consisting of 

 a finite multitude of independent 

 entities which he terms "Reals," of 

 which we know nothing but their 

 existence or that they are ''posited." 

 The manner in which, out of this 

 plurality of independent Reals, an 

 orderly scheme or system results, is 

 nowhere clearly explained by Her- 

 bart. He indeed maintains that 

 relations exist between this multi- 

 tude of Reals, but "it is really 

 very difficult to say what we are 

 to understand by the hazy con- 

 ception of a relation which is quite 

 indifferent to its related entities. 

 And it is equally difficult to com- 

 bine with this the other concep- 

 tion that there exists a certain kind 

 of relation in which two entities 

 are no longer quite indifferent to 

 each other, but where the differ- 

 ence of their qualities acquires such 

 an importance that what we usu- 

 ally term interaction takes place. 

 This relation, which is the condi- 

 tion of a causal connection between 

 the Reals, Herbart terms ' their 



Together ' : to begin with only in 

 an abstract sense ; further on, how- 

 ever, without any clear reason, as 

 a 'Together' in Space" (Lotze, in 

 ' Geschichte der Neueren Philos- 

 ophic,' Lecture Syllabus, 1882, p. 

 91). Further on we learn "that 

 what happens consists in a change 

 of relations between the Reals, and 

 what is really new takes place 

 only in the consciousness of an 

 observer to whom those Reals 

 present different phenomena ac- 

 cordingly as they are variously 

 connected, like the trees in a 

 wood which to the approaching 

 eye separate but at a distance 

 merge into one mass, whereas they 

 themselves experience no change 

 whatever" (Ibid., p. 92; also 

 Herbart's 'Works'). 



2 There was another and a per- 

 sonal trait common to Herbart and 

 Schopenhauer, though they in other 

 respects represent a peculiar con- 

 trast in thought and personality. 

 Neither of them had any theological 

 interest. They are the first two 

 eminent thinkers of modern times 

 who did not come to philosophy 

 from the side of theology. But 

 whereas Schopenhauer had a deep 

 sympathy with the mystical side of 

 religion, this was quite foreign to 



