498 



PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT. 



41. 



Ethics the 

 root of 

 Meta- 

 physics. 



were, the knowledge which the objective mind possesses 

 of the essence of things ; and yet this knowledge and 

 truth only becomes a reality for the whole soul through 

 the higher activity of faith and practice, through sub- 

 mission to law and order. 



From this we see that Lotze recedes from the purely 

 intellectual attitude of the Hegelian school. The realisa- 

 tion of the Absolute is not to be found in the intellectual 

 process but in practice. Accordingly the root of Meta- 

 physics lies in Ethics. The essence of Eeality, the truly 

 Eeal, is an ethical ideal, a moral conception. It is the 

 conception of the highest moral worth. All the forms 

 of existence have true reality only to the extent that 

 they contribute to the realisation of this highest 

 moral ideal. Their reality consists in their value for the 

 attainment of this end i.e., in their intrinsic worth. 



Before giving somewhat more explicitly the final ex- 

 pression in which Lotze summarises his answer to the 

 problem of Reality, it is interesting to note how he 

 assimilates the leading ideas contained in the earlier 

 philosophies with which we have become acquainted. 

 With him the problem of Reality, of the truly Real, and 

 of degrees of Reality, becomes again the central problem 

 in philosophy : as such it is introduced on the first 

 pages of his earliest work. 1 From the speculations of 



the individual mind has no merit ; 

 it is only through the higher 

 activity of faith and conduct, in 

 the submission to custom and right 

 [law], that what has been accepted 

 as truth is confirmed as a reality 

 for the individual mind itself " 

 (p. 10). 



1 It is to be regretted, as has 



already been pointed out by Erd- 

 tnann in a well-considered digest 

 of Lotze's doctrine ('Geschichte 

 der Philosophic,' 3rd ed. vol. ii. p. 

 841 sqq.), that Lotze's earliest work, 

 the ' Metaphysik,' has been unduly 

 neglected in favour of his later 

 scientific, popular, and systematic 

 writings. For the history of 



