OF NATURE. 563 



(1843) and "The Soul" (1846), as well as in his three 

 works on Pathology and Physiology (1842, 1851, 1852). 

 Ignorant or oblivious of the fact that these writings of 

 Lotze contained only one side of his philosophical creed, 

 Carl Vogt utilised some of the arguments contained 

 therein to attack the somewhat dubious position which 

 the celebrated physiologist Eudolph Wagner had taken 

 up to the questions of the Soul, spiritual existence, and 

 religious faith, a view which Lotze himself did not 

 share or support. It was easy to show how, by an 

 application of the purely mechanical conceptions of 

 Matter and Force, great progress had been made in 

 the description and explanation of phenomena and 

 processes within the living organism, and how the 

 psychological or metaphysical conceptions of Mind, Soul, 

 Life, and Consciousness contributed nothing towards an 

 exact definition and understanding of these phenomena. 

 It was not clearly recognised at the time, except 



Pathology, aud if Lotze himself had j we wish to distinguish strictly 



not adopted a peculiar metaphysic j between Sensationalism and Ma- 



of his own, of which it is difficult terialism, we must give the for- 



to understand how it could main- mer name only to those systems 



tain itself by the side of his own which hold to the origin of our 



critical acumen " (English Trans- knowledge from the senses, and 



lation by Thomas, 1880, vol. ii. attach no importance to the power 



p. 285). Lange then proceeds to of constructing the universe from 



show how Czolbe was stimulated atoms, molecules, or other modifi- 



through Lotze's critical destruction cations of matter. The Sensa- 



of the supersensible notion of vital tionalist may assume that matter 



force to make the destruction of is mere representation, because 



the Supersensible as such the prin- what we have immediately in 



ciple of a comprehensive philosophic perception is only sensation and 



creed. In this endeavour Lange not 'matter.' But he may also, 



shows, as had already been shown i like Locke, be inclined to refer 



by Lotze himself in his review spirit to matter. So soon, how- 



of Czolbe's principal work (1855, ever, as this becomes the essential 



reprinted in ' Kleiue Schriften,' ! basis of the whole system, we have 



vol. iii. p. 238), how materialism j before us genuine Materialism " 



and sensationalism are apt to be I (p. 286). 

 insufficiently distinguished. " If 



