OP NATURE. 583 



dynamics. And lastly, we have the theory of evolution 

 par excellence, as set out in Herbert Spencer's synthetic 

 philosophy, with its alternating processes of differentia- 

 tion and integration, and its recurrent cycles similar to 

 those elaborated by the Stoics in ancient times. 



But whilst it is interesting to learn what are the _. fo. 



Want of 



ultimate consequences to which any special and useful F c h a nnter^st 

 line of exact reasoning leads, it cannot be denied that mechanical 

 little philosophical interest attaches to most of these 

 mechanical theories. In order to be scientifically con- 

 sistent they have to strip the fundamental notions they 

 employ of those psychological attributes, of that sub- 

 jective colouring which attaches to them, and which 

 alone makes them suitable for describing the phenomena 

 of life and consciousness, so as to draw them into the 

 circle of exact scientific discussion. They alone are of 

 supreme interest to philosophical thought. So far as 

 nature herself is concerned, these her most interesting 

 traits seem to be preserved and revealed only in a 

 synoptic (poetical and artistic) as opposed to a purely 

 analytic and synthetic (scientific or exact) contemplation 

 of her phenomena and events. 



In order to solve the problem of nature in the philo- 

 sophical sense i.e., in the sense in which Schelling and 

 the earlier philosophy of Nature understood it it would 

 be necessary to introduce into the system of purely 

 mechanical ideas some term which specifically denotes, 

 symbolises, or describes the essential character of the 

 processes peculiar to the living and conscious world. 

 And this term cannot itself again be reduced to purely 

 mechanical conditions and attributes. Nor will it be 



