588 



PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT. 



not lost down to the present moment. There is no 

 doubt that what has been termed the voluntaristic 

 tendency in recent philosophy is largely to be traced 

 back to the impression which Schopenhauer's writings 

 have made on many of the foremost representatives of 

 modern thought, although few of the latter now follow 

 the special lines into which he developed his central and 

 fundamental idea. 



For we must not overlook the fact that Schopenhauer 

 was not primarily led to his speculations by a special 

 interest in nature and natural phenomena, such as 

 actuated Schelling. He branched off from the main 

 trunk line of idealistic thought at a point anterior to 

 Schelling's philosophy of nature, which at the time does 

 not seem to have much impressed him. His philosophical 

 tradition was Kantian, his inspiration came from Plato, 

 and, though he barely admitted it, he was influenced by 

 Fichte. 1 And he remained completely entangled in the 



other contributions of his had not 

 escaped the notice of eminent 

 scientists, notably medical authori- 

 ties, such as the physician, J. D. 

 Brandis of Copenhagen, and the 

 ophthalmologist, Anton Rosas of 

 Vienna, but that they in an un- 

 pardonable manner did not acknow- 

 ledge their indebtedness to him, 

 and this leads him into a lengthy 

 diatribe against the dishonesty of 

 German literary practice, taking the 

 opportunity to contrast with it the 

 gentlemanly tone of ' The Edinburgh 

 Review,' an admission which he, 

 however, retracts in the third 

 edition. 



1 This apparent resemblance to 

 Fichte, from whose writings many 

 sentences may be collected which 

 are almost identical with some of 

 Schopenhauer's, is, however, accom- 



panied by a fundamental difference 

 which separates him from Fichte 

 and Fichte's immediate followers, 

 and may probably be one of the 

 reasons why he never acknow- 

 ledged his indebtedness to Fichte. 

 The difference is well brought 

 out in an excellent sketch of 

 Schopenhauer's doctrine by Dr 

 Lehmann in a recent publication 

 already referred to (' Grosse Den- 

 ker,' vol. ii. pp. 269-297). " Schop- 

 enhauer's Will is a blind and aimless 

 impulse, and here lies the difference 

 which separates decisively his con- 

 ception of Will from that of Kant 

 and Fichte. Kant's Will is alto- 

 gether a rational power opposed in 

 its nature to desire, not an im- 

 pulse or something impulsive but 

 a power through motives of reason 

 to resist impulse : it has in reality 



