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PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT. 



everything. 1 From this spell of mechanical connec- 

 tions, geometrical configurations or genealogical trees, 

 to which we may add statistical regularities, it has 

 always been the object of a deeper philosophy of 



1 Three thinkers of the very first 

 order have given expression, quite 

 independently of each other, to 

 this reflection. The first is Goethe, 

 who frequently dwells on the sub- 

 ject, but most explicitly in a 

 conversation with Eckermann in 

 the year 1824 : " As soon as one 

 belongs in science to a narrow con- 

 fession, the unbiassed truthful view 

 is at once gone. The decided 

 Vulcanist will always see things 

 through the eyeglass of the Vul- 

 canist, in the same way as the 

 Neptunist and the adherent of the 

 recent 'elevation' theory will do 

 so only through his own. The 

 view of all such theorists, who 

 are obsessed by a special exclusive 

 aspect, has lost its innocence, and 

 objects no more appear in their 

 natural purity. Whenever such 

 students give an account of their 

 observations, we do not, in spite 

 of the greatest personal veracity, 

 receive in any way the truth of 

 the object ; we receive things ever 

 only with the taste of a strong 

 subjective flavouring. But I am 

 far from maintaining that an 

 unbiassed correct knowledge stands 

 in the way of observation ; rather 

 the old truth stands, that we really 

 have only eyes and ears for what 

 we know. The professional musi- 

 cian hears, in the concord of the 

 orchestra, every instrument and 

 every single note ; whereas an out- 

 sider remains embarrassed through 

 the massive action of the whole. 

 So also the man who merely enjoys 

 himself sees only the graceful sur- 

 face of a green and flowery meadow, 

 whereas the eye of the observing 

 botanist is struck by the infinite 

 detail of the most various single 



plants and grasses. ... In science 

 we meet persons who, by dint of 

 too much erudition and hypothesis, 

 never get back to seeing and hear- 

 ing. With them everything turns 

 rapidly inside ; they are so much 

 occupied with what they are pon- 

 dering, that it happens to them as 

 to a man in a passion who passes 

 his nearest friends on the road 

 without seeing them. Observation 

 of nature requires a certain quiet 

 purity of the inner self which is 

 disturbed by nothing, nor pre- 

 occupied. . . . Would to God that 

 we all were no more than good 

 labourers ! Just because we want 

 to be more, and carry about with 

 us a large apparatus of philosophy 

 and hypotheses, we spoil things." 

 The second is Ruskin, who, at 

 the end of the third volume of 

 ' Modern Painters,' makes the same 

 reflection, though he applies it 

 somewhat differently : " This com- 

 parative dimness and untraceable- 

 ness of the thoughts which are 

 the source of our admiration is not 

 a fault in the thoughts at such 

 a time. It is, on the contrary, a 

 necessary condition of their sub- 

 ordination to the pleasure of Sight. 

 If the thoughts were more distinct 

 we should not see so well ; and 

 beginning definitely to think we 

 must comparatively cease to see. 

 . . . It is evident that a curiously 

 balanced condition of the powers 

 of mind is necessary to induce full 

 admiration of any natural scene. 

 Let those powers be themselves 

 inert, and the mind vacant of 

 knowledge and destitute of sensi- 

 bility, and the external object 

 becomes little more to us than it 

 is to birds or insects ; we fall into 



